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I am far from denying the real force of the arguments in proof of a God… but these do not warm 
me or enlighten me; they do not take away the winter of my desolation or make the buds unfold 
and the leaves grow within me, and my moral being rejoice.  
– John Henry Newman 
 
Chapter One: Praelocutio 
 
Introduction 
 
Rodion Romanovich Raskolnikov, the protagonist of Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Crime and 
Punishment, carries out the murder of two individuals—a pawn broker (who is often referred to 
in the story as “the old crone”) and the pawn broker’s sister. Throughout the book Raskolnikov’s 
motives are not entirely clear. The issue is not simply that Dostoevsky is using his authorial 
prerogative to withhold the reasons or motives from us. Raskolnikov is also somewhat double-
minded or at odds with himself such that he acts in conflict with his own desires and ideas at 
different points. Before committing the act of murder, he spends months thinking, and the act is a 
working out of his theories about morality and ethics, some part of which he has published 
previously. Raskolnikov has thought and deliberated, seeking to understand what a man is 
capable of, what a man is justified in doing. After this deliberation, he commits the murder 
(which becomes murders), and this by the end of part one of a six-part novel. Much of the rest of 
the novel recounts Raskolnikov grappling with this act after he has carried it out. 
 Once the act is committed, Raskolnikov is almost immediately overtaken by a fever and 
he continues to distance himself relationally from other people even while circumstances force 
him into contact with more and more people. He is by turns extremely generous with those he 
encounters and angry at and distant from many of the same individuals. Deep within him there is 
conflict; there is turmoil. His soul is divided and at odds. He is plagued by various dreams which 
aid in evidencing this. At one point, nearly halfway through the novel he has a dream where he is 
back in the room where the murder was committed, Dostoevsky writes: 
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The apartment door was standing wide open; he thought a moment and went in. 
The entryway was very dark and empty, not a soul, as though everything had been 
taken out; quietly, on tiptoe, he moved on into the living room: the whole room 
was brightly flooded with moonlight; everything here was as it had been: the 
chairs, the mirror, the yellow sofa, the pictures in their frames. A huge, round, 
copper-red moon was looking straight in the window. “It’s because of the moon 
that it’s so silent,” thought Raskolnikov, “asking some riddle, no doubt.” He stood 
and waited, waited a long time, and the more silent the moon was, the harder his 
heart pounded—it was even becoming painful. And still the same silence. 
Suddenly there came a brief, dry crack like the snapping of a twig; then 
everything was still again. An awakened fly suddenly swooped and struck against 
the window, buzzing plaintively. At the same moment he made out what seemed 
to be a woman’s wrap hanging in the corner between a small cupboard and the 
window. “Why is that wrap here?” he thought, “it wasn’t here before…” He 
approached quietly and realized that someone seemed to be hiding there behind 
the wrap. He cautiously moved the wrap aside with his hand and saw a chair 
standing there, and on the chair, in the corner, sat the little old crone, all hunched 
up, with her head bent down so that there was no way he could see her face—but 
it was she. He stood over her. “Afraid!” he thought, and he quietly freed the axe 
from its loop and struck the old woman on the crown of the head, once and then 
again. But, strangely, she did not even stir under his blows, as though she were 
made of wood. He became frightened, bent closer, and began looking at her, but 
she also bent her head still lower. Then he bent down all the way to the floor and 
peeked into her face from below, peeked and went dead: the little old crone was 
sitting there laughing—simply dissolving in soft, inaudible laughter, trying her 
best not to let him hear her. He suddenly fancied that the door to the bedroom had 
opened a little, and there also seemed to be laughter and whispering there. Rage 
overcame him: he began hitting the old woman on the head with all his strength, 
but at every blow of the axe the laughing and whispering from the bedroom grew 
stronger and louder, and the little crone heaved all over with laughter. He wanted 
to run away, but now the whole entryway is full of people, all the doors to the 
stairs are wide open, and on the landings, on the stairway, farther down there are 
people, head to head, all looking—but all hushed waiting, silent… His heart 
shrank, his feet became rooted and refused to move… He tried to cry out—and 
woke up.1 
 
 This sequence helps to underline the almost haunting quality the act has had on him. He 
is trying to think himself out of the chaos in his soul. He is trying to understand what he is 
capable of and whether he can live with the consequences. It is only to Sofya (Sonya) 
Semyonovna he is able to pour out his heart and confess, though he stumbles through this 
 
1 Fyodor Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment (New York: Vintage Classics, 1993), 276-278. 
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confession because of his guilt and pride. During this encounter, the conflict in his soul and 
Sonya’s awareness of it are evident: “His eyes were burning with a feverish fire. He was almost 
beginning to rave; a troubled smile wandered over his lips. A terrible powerlessness showed 
through his agitated state of mind. Sonya realized how he was suffering.”2 
 This thesis deals with themes from epistemology, philosophy of religion, and ethics. It is 
about what and how we can know about God. It is about who we are as people and how we live. 
Raskolnikov comes face to face with these issues as each of us must. We act and experience 
consequences. We cannot run from morality and the outcomes of our choices. Raskolnikov finds 
himself plagued by his conscience and also by the personness of Sonya. Slowly he is learning 
something about his life, about his actions and choices, about reality. And these answers do not 
come at the end of a logical argument but from within his conscience and in the face of a living 
person.  
 
Some Preliminary Points 
The main premise of this work is that there is knowledge that goes beyond propositional 
knowledge (or is deeper than propositional knowledge), and further that this knowledge points 
toward something or someone supernatural or transcendent. By propositional knowledge I have 
in mind the commonly referenced type of knowledge which focuses on the content and analysis 
of propositions, which possess truth values, truth or falsity. For instance, the statement, “I know 
that this music (with the referenced music being the sheet music or audio of Chopin’s Sonata 2) 
is the Sonata 2 in B-flat Minor, Opus 35 by Frederic Francois Chopin,” which is or is not true 
depending on whether or not this actually is the case. This may also be called “knowledge that,” 
 
2 Fyodor Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 417. 
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referencing the way in which it is typically expressed within philosophical writing. Propositional 
knowledge provides a significant amount of our knowledge and has the distinct advantage of 
being easily analyzable; for instance, if Chopin did not write the music being referenced, then the 
proposition is false and does not constitute knowledge. 
Propositional knowledge is a vital category of knowledge; much of what it is that we 
know can be captured in the form of propositions and the result is something more easily 
analyzable and useful for argumentation and development of knowledge. Even within what I am 
attempting to point to or emphasize within this work, much will still be able to be captured in 
some way by propositional accounts. Therefore, when I mention non-propositional knowledge or 
an expansive epistemology, the idea is not to place something in opposition to propositional 
knowledge, but to emphasize something that is relevant but perhaps not receiving as much 
attention as it deserves. 
 Eleonore Stump has pointed out that the tendency within some areas of analytic 
philosophy3 is to focus on propositional knowledge as the primary form of knowledge. “Know-
how knowledge,” “knowledge by acquaintance,” or some other categorization may sometimes be 
referenced or considered, but this is a much less common occurrence.4 Propositional knowledge 
is typically expressed in the form “S knows that p,” where “S” represents the knowing subject, 
and “p” represents the proposition known by the subject.5 
 
3 Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), ch. 3. 
4 Matthias Steup, “Epistemology,” the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/epistemology/, 1, for an example 
of this. 
5 Ibid. 
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 Acquaintance knowledge and know-how knowledge are not completely ignored areas of 
epistemology but seem not to receive quite as much attention as propositional knowledge. This is 
not particularly strange since propositional knowledge clearly has advantages in terms of its 
analyzability, and arguably has greater application to many topics within philosophy. However, 
my argument will be that there are things like acquaintance knowledge, know-how knowledge, 
personal knowledge, and so forth which are evidentially significant for a moral argument for 
theism. Moving forward, I will not be using the terms “acquaintance knowledge” or “know-how 
knowledge” to refer to what I am pointing to (mostly because my primary epistemological 
interlocutors do not use these terms), but it is likely that what is being discussed will overlap 
with interpretations of either or both of these (especially acquaintance knowledge). 
 Eleonore Stump has put forth extensive argumentation for a type of knowledge she 
characterizes as “Franciscan knowledge,” and, more specifically, argues for a subspecies of this 
knowledge characterized as “knowledge of persons.” This Franciscan knowledge is knowledge 
which cannot be expressed in propositional form without remainder. In a similar fashion (though 
over a hundred years earlier) John Henry Newman lays out an epistemological system in his 
book An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent and differentiates between formal and informal 
inference; in his system, informal inference is a process of reasoning that is performed by what 
he calls the “Illative” sense, and the results of this process cannot be expressed in purely logical 
terms (i.e. in propositional format). 
 Such a tendency to extend one’s epistemic approach beyond strictly propositional 
knowledge is evident throughout the history of the moral argument. Having canvassed a large 
swathe of luminaries within the field of moral apologetics, David Baggett and Jerry Walls 
describe the approach to knowledge of the various philosophers and thinkers in the following 
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way: “Few were narrow logic choppers or abstemious empiricists; they were open to the 
deliverances of relations, literature, poetry, emotions, and aesthetics.”6 Reality is not so easily 
captured—a moment, a glance, a twitch communicates. A laugh can unsettle or set at ease. A 
loved one’s eyes can gleam with disdain or spark with passion. All of the little things between 
people, the heights and depths delivered by poetry, literature, and music—these are things that 
cannot be fully contained in propositions, at least not without losing some part of what is actually 
known in these situations.7 
 
Narratives and Overview of Project 
The purpose of this current chapter has been to briefly set the stage for what is to come. 
The section just concluded has endeavored to point to the place within the philosophical world at 
which discussion is aimed; I have stated that there are important considerations lying beyond 
propositional knowledge, and once these have been brought to light we will find additional 
resources for the moral argument for theism as we appropriately expand our epistemic strategy. 
The first section of this chapter included narrative selections from Crime and Punishment to help 
illustrate what is at issue—the intensely personal and experiential questions of how one should 
live and how this knowledge may come about. Additionally, I have introduced a storyline—that 
of Raskolnikov—to which we shall return in the fifth chapter of this work. As intimated, there 
are things Raskolnikov is learning that apply to the subject of this thesis, and we can learn along 
 
6 David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls, The Moral Argument: A History (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2019), 214. 
7 The results are likely to include the propositional, but the experiences generally are not reducible to 
propositions; in saying there is more of relevance here, I am in some ways shifting the evaluation from the 
conclusions (which may often be in propositional format) to the process of getting there. There is knowledge (maybe 
only in the sense of depth if not purely new content) that occurs in the experiences and encounters leading up to the 
conclusion itself. 
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with him in a way that is not possible in the same way through propositional formats. A fuller, 
richer picture of knowledge results, then, from the combination of propositional and experiential 
knowledge—or so this thesis will argue. 
 Martha Nussbaum8 and Eleonore Stump9 have both argued for the utility of literature 
within philosophy. Stump emphasizes its importance due to the nature of knowledge of persons. 
Though this Franciscan knowledge cannot be propositionally formulated, the form of narrative 
provides a means for conveying some part of what would be known in the encounter of persons. 
Building from Stump’s work in the following chapters, the use of narratives will aid in the 
illustration and clarification of the points regarding knowledge and morality. Hopefully, many of 
these points will begin to unfold and become clearer as we continue along in this exploration of 
these issues and ideas. 
 In chapter two we will take a deeper look at John Henry Newman’s and Eleonore 
Stump’s epistemological frameworks to illustrate more clearly what the limitations of 
propositional knowledge are and what role an appropriately expansive epistemology might play. 
Chapter three will consist of an exploration of relevant facets of personalism and development of 
personal knowledge. These chapters will prepare us for chapter four in which we will begin 
drawing connections to the moral argument for theism. Finally, chapter five will see a return to 
Crime and Punishment to further illustrate various points via narrative. 
  
 
8 Martha Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990). 
9 Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness, chs. 2-4. 
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This universal living scene of things is after all as little a logical world as it is a poetical; and, as 
it cannot without violence be exalted into poetic perfection, neither can it be attenuated into 
logical formulation. 
– John Henry Newman 
 
Chapter Two: The Limits of Propositional Knowledge and an Expansive Epistemology 
Introduction 
The goal with this chapter is to utilize the epistemological considerations of John Henry 
Newman and Eleonore Stump in demonstrating the need for an expansive epistemology and 
investigating in what ways it can be expressed. It will remain for future chapters to illustrate the 
full significance of this toward the philosophy of religion. 
 It must of course be acknowledged that there will be some difficulties particular to this 
enterprise and inherent within its presentation. In thus arguing for non-propositional knowledge 
and ways of knowing, it will be impossible to elucidate in exclusively propositional terms that 
which is, by definition, not propositional. Especially in describing where these expansive 
epistemology concerns occur, much may be analyzed and explained, but conveying, on the other 
hand, what is contained or expressed in non-propositional knowledge is not so easily achievable. 
Thus, great care will be taken to express or gesture toward things as much as possible. In 
addition, as has been mentioned in the previous chapter, narrative and literature will be more apt 
at expressing what may escape propositional formulation, and thus will be a part of the attempted 
elucidation. With such preliminaries concluded we will begin with an examination of John Henry 
Newman’s thought as contained within An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent.10 
 
 
 
 
10 John Henry Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (Columbia, SC: Assumption Press, 2013). 
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Newman’s Epistemology 
Newman’s epistemological system is fairly intricate and yet in places ambiguous.11 We 
will begin by investigating his conception of apprehension along with his distinctions between 
the real and the notional. Following this we will briefly assess his theory of inference, which will 
lead to a discussion of the illative sense.  
 
Apprehension, the Real and the Notional  
Apprehension is the intelligent acceptance of an idea.12 This does not require 
comprehension; at minimum it is seeing that something is so, having an awareness of something. 
Once we have apprehended a proposition,13 we can doubt, infer, or assent. To doubt is to hold 
the proposition in suspense, neither inferring nor assenting. To infer is to conclude on the basis 
of premises, while to assent is to give absolute acceptance to a proposition without any 
conditions. Of these, inference and assent are most important to the present discussion and will 
be fleshed out more in what follows. 
 Apprehension can take place in two different modes: real and notional (and thus an 
assent or inference may be one or the other). The category or mode “real” refers to things and its 
referents are singular terms and unit; 14 what is real most often comes from experience. The mode 
 
11 For instance, there is some ambiguity in how he describes “first principles” and the manifestation of the 
illative sense; Andrew Meszaros, “Newman and First Principles: The Noetic Dimension of the Illative Sense,” The 
Heythrop Journal 59, no. 5 (September 2018): 770-782, 770f. 
12 Newman’s explanations of apprehension and the differences between “real” and “notional” are primarily 
unpacked within chapters 1-4 of the Grammar of Assent. 
13 Note here that in Newman’s terminology a proposition is essentially any item or concept which can be 
known or apprehended in some sense, and not the more modern and narrow philosophical usage for expressing 
“knowledge that.” 
14 By “unit,” Newman means that what is apprehended in real apprehension is unified, or taken as one 
thing, in contrast to notional apprehension, which views things more by its parts and separates what is apprehended 
into “notions.” 
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of “notional,” however, does not stand for things, but for notions, and its referents are common; 
what is notional comes from abstraction.15 It is important to realize that the descriptors of “real” 
and “notional” are not strictly governing the thing apprehended and informing us of the nature of 
what is apprehended, but rather is describing in what way the individual has apprehended. That 
is, it is individuals who apprehend propositions really or notionally and not the things 
apprehended which are either real or notional. This being said, there will be things which may 
not admit of real or notional apprehension due to the nature of reality.16 
 Some examples are in order. Note how a child in school may memorize long passages of 
someone like Homer or Shakespeare and have some cursory or limited understanding of the 
poetry, but then later in life, after experience has opened his eyes and expanded his horizons, the 
poetry unlocks, so to speak, within his mind and settles on him with a depth and wisdom he 
could not apprehend before that moment.17 Again, one may consider something like grief. It is 
one thing to contemplate the idea, “My loved ones are mortal and will die because all people 
die,” and another to learn that your father has cancer, or your sister has been in a car accident. In 
both cases, the first apprehension is notional while the second is real. 
 Certain distinctions can further clarify and distinguish the real and the notional.18 First, 
notional apprehension has to do with notions or aspects of things, working with aggregates, 
 
15 Newman, Grammar of Assent, 22. 
16 For instance, it seems unlikely that one could have a real apprehension of a logical principle like the law 
of non-contradiction, though one may be able to have a real apprehension of some situation in which the law applies. 
17 For a similar example of Newman’s own: John Henry Newman, Grammar of Assent, 56f. 
18 I am indebted to the analyses of both John Crosby and Michael Olson here: John Crosby, The 
Personalism of John Henry Newman (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2014), 38ff; 
Michael R. Olson, “Real Apprehension in Newman’s An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent,” International 
Philosophical Quarterly 45, no. 4 (2005). 
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while real apprehension has to do with concrete unity. Consider our first example of a Homeric 
or Shakespearean poem. To apprehend it notionally is to apprehend its parts, to see the literary 
style or themes, to comprehend the words, to see the narrative structure. To apprehend it really is 
to see it as that poem, as a unit, and whole work, not comparing it to other works. It is singular, 
and the apprehension of it is an apprehension of it as whole and sui generis.19 
 Second, notional apprehension begins and ends with the mind’s own abstract and 
constructive reasoning properties, while real apprehension is experiential. Take our Homeric or 
Shakespearean example again; in our notional apprehension, we are taking the separate aspects 
of the poem, isolating, and comparing them with other elements to comprehend the poem. We 
think about a theme of love and consider how other poems have developed the same theme and 
so forth. In doing such, we are taking disparate notions, comparing and contrasting, constructing 
new understandings and concepts. All of this is internal and within the mind. To apprehend it in 
a real way, we must in some way experience it. Perhaps the child of our example read a 
Shakespearean sonnet on love for class and found it interesting and insightful. Then, upon falling 
in love for the first time, he feels within his soul the Shakespearean lines: 
 … Love is not love 
 Which alters when it alteration finds, 
 Or bends with the remover to remove. 
 O no! it is an ever-fixed mark 
 That looks on tempests and is never shaken.20 
 
 Now, because of the new experiences regarding love, the child experiences the poem in a 
way he had not before and enters into a real apprehension of it. 
 
19 Newman, Grammar of Assent, 182f. In Olson’s technical language: “… It is the unity of actuality, a unity 
that comprehends complexity by virtue of hierarchical ordering”; see Olson, “Real Apprehension,” 509. 
20 William Shakespeare, “Sonnet 116: Let me not to the marriage of true minds,” 
https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/45106/sonnet-116-let-me-not-to-the-marriage-of-true-minds, lines 2-6. 
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 Finally, notional apprehension is more capable of achieving clarity while real 
apprehension is often affected by a sort of obscurity. This is primarily due to the nature of what 
is being apprehended in each case. Notions, abstracted and separated from the experience and 
concrete unity, can be expressed in clearer terms, generally; in fact, the formal inferential process 
(to be discussed in detail next) generally begins by first stripping down terms to the most 
narrowly defined premises possible. The objects of real apprehension, however, must remain 
concrete and experiential and often resist clear expression (at least in propositional terms). 
 Again, propositions (objects/things/notions) to be apprehended can be apprehended really 
or notionally. We may then infer or assent.21 It will now be useful to further clarify Newman’s 
conception of inference, which can be either formal or informal, as well as the illative sense 
which is instrumental in the latter. 
 
Formal and Informal Inference  
When Newman uses the term “inference,” he seems to have in mind our normal 
reasoning processes such as deductive, inductive, or abductive reasoning. By formal inference 
Newman means something very much like deductive logic or deductive reasoning. Newman’s 
inferential method consists of establishing propositions, forming a proof, and analyzing it, which 
Newman sees as resulting in the Aristotelian syllogism. He does not think the presentation is 
required to be this technical, however, to be inferential. “Verbal reasoning, of whatever kind, as 
opposed to mental, is what I mean by inference, which differs from logic only inasmuch as logic 
is its scientific form.”22 
 
21 Again, we are leaving out doubt as an action here since it is extraneous to our purposes. 
22 Newman, Grammar of Assent, 174. 
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 Formal inference as a process is focused primarily on the relations of propositions to one 
another and works most effectively when terms are as simple and narrow in meaning as possible; 
the more abstract and notional the terms are, the more suitable the propositions become for the 
inferential process.23 Newman describes this transition masterfully: 
The concrete matter of propositions is a constant source of trouble to syllogistic 
reasoning, as marring the simplicity and perfection of its process. Words, which 
denote things, have innumerable implications; but in inferential exercises it is the 
very triumph of that clearness and hardness of head, which is the characteristic 
talent for the art, to have stripped them of that depth and breadth of associations, 
which constitute their poetry, their rhetoric, and their historical life, to have 
starved each term down till it has become the ghost of itself, and everywhere one 
and the same ghost, “omnibus umbra locis,” so that it may stand for just one 
unreal aspect of the concrete thing to which it properly belongs, for a relation, a 
generalization, or other abstraction, for a notion neatly turned out of the 
laboratory of the mind, and sufficiently tame and subdued, because existing only 
as a definition. 
 Thus it is that the logician for his own purposes, and most usefully as far 
as those purposes are concerned, turns rivers, full, winding, and beautiful, into 
navigable canals.24 
 
 And so formal inference is most closely linked to notional apprehension, but this is where 
the need for consideration beyond the propositional arises. The world we encounter is a living 
world of concrete entities—the world is real, not notional. Formal inference and the notional can 
deliver important and useful information, but when what is needed is real and experiential, it 
may be that notional apprehension misses something of value.25 In discussing the deliverances of 
science, which falls under this heading, Newman says, “Science, working by itself, reaches truth 
in the abstract, and probability in the concrete; but what we aim at is truth in the concrete.”26 
 
23 Ibid., 174-175. 
24 Ibid., 176. 
25 Remember our second distinction regarding “real” and “notional”: the notional cannot extend beyond 
“the mind’s own abstract and constructive reasoning properties.” 
26 Newman, Grammar of Assent, 183. 
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Logic and formal inference can provide ways of bringing facts together and processing them 
efficiently, and works well for deliberating and puzzling things out within the mind.27 
Consequently, formal inference is not lacking utility. Beyond this, it is natural and good as a way 
we process information and move forward in the world. But there are limitations—formal 
inference cannot well deliver apprehension of the real, which is individual, concrete, and 
experiential.28 
 Newman’s theory of how we come to apprehend in a real way involves the use of the 
illative sense and the process of informal inference. For Newman the illative sense is the innate 
faculty that carries out informal inferences and allows one to reason in concrete matters of fact; 
formal inference is not suited for the task because concrete reality has innumerable aspects that 
cannot be propositionally (in the narrow sense) analyzed the way notions can. John Crosby says 
that informal inference “works not only with our experience as formulated in propositions, but 
also with that ‘excess’ of experience that cannot be propositionally formulated.”29 
 By informal inference, Newman seems to have in mind something similar to inductive or 
abductive reasoning. The illative sense is a faculty like that of Aristotle’s phronesis, which “is 
the directing, controlling, and determining principle in such matters [conduct], personal and 
social.”30 As an example, Newman believes formal inference may be able to lead to laws, rules, 
principles, examples, and so forth in something like ethical systems, but these must be applied to 
concrete, particular cases. When the concrete and particular is faced, an individual reasons 
 
27 Ibid., 188. 
28 This does not mean nothing of our experience can be captured in notional form, but only that the two 
(experience and the “notional”) are not perfectly well-suited to each other. 
29 Crosby, Personalism of John Henry Newman, 120. 
30 Newman, Grammar of Assent, 231. 
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himself, personally, from the totality of his knowledge and experience. He uses his judgment and 
makes deliverances, heart and mind, about that which has not been proved except possibly in the 
abstract.31 
 Crosby relates formal and informal inference to computer processing; a formal inference 
can be processed surely and efficiently by a computer, but an informal inference cannot just 
because the relevant data could never be sufficiently entered into the computer.32 As should be 
clear, this follows from our understanding of real apprehension. For one to apprehend really, one 
must apprehend the proposition as a concrete unit; it is indivisible and experiential.33 Because the 
concrete is beyond what can be fully analyzed and formally inferred, informal inference is 
personal, and we take responsibility for the conclusions at which we arrive.34 For these reasons 
Crosby suggests two primary distinctions of informal inference as active and personal.35 Formal 
inference can be passive and anonymous in the sense that one can follow the reasoning to its 
conclusions without involving anything unique to himself. Everything is notional, abstract, and 
could be accomplished by anyone the same way with the same data. Informal inference moves 
beyond these. In the end, we need propositional accounts of knowledge; these considerations 
 
31 It is not clear that an epistemic “faculty” (i.e. an illative sense) is necessary or useful for capturing these 
ideas, but as this is how Newman has presented his epistemology, I will retain the use of “illative sense.” At the 
least, hopefully the comments regarding the illative sense will make clear what processes are at issue. 
32 Crosby, Personalism of John Henry Newman, 120. 
33 I would like to clarify once again Newman’s usage of “proposition” in a broader sense; this particular 
point regarding apprehending the proposition as a concrete unit is an example of what I am arguing cannot be fully 
reduced to propositional knowledge, though some propositions can be stated. For example, “I know Mary”; I can 
utter this proposition and extend various premises in propositional format, but if I apprehend Mary in a real way, as 
a concrete unit, there is more that is known, or at least something deeper that is known than what I am expressing in 
however many propositions regarding the conclusion “I know Mary.” Hopefully, as we continue this will become 
clearer and its significance will become more apparent. 
34 Ibid., 123. 
35 Ibid., 125. 
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should serve to remind us that there may be relevant items aside from the propositional account 
which are evidentially significant. 
 The illative sense may be more or less evident in various cases. My illative sense may be 
less evident today on a conclusion relating to science such as that the earth revolves around the 
sun; on the other hand, in many moral and religious situations it may be far more apparent as in 
forming a decision on utilitarianism versus consequentialism or deliberating on a difficult moral 
dilemma. In these decisions I must move beyond formal inference to make a conclusion that is to 
some extent personal. 
 We will further narrow in on the importance of these things for our assessment of 
propositional knowledge and an expansive epistemology below, but this should serve to provide 
an understanding of Newman’s epistemological framework. We shall now turn to the work of 
Eleonore Stump regarding what she calls Franciscan knowledge, as detailed within her 
magnificent work Wandering in Darkness. 
 
Stump’s Epistemology 
Eleonore Stump begins her epic work with a detailed explanation of her project. Her 
overall purpose has to do with utilizing narratives in a defense against the problem of suffering; 
she believes narratives are useful because of her theory of Franciscan knowledge. In a 
typological sense one can think of the analytical tradition and propositional accounts of 
knowledge as Dominican, and knowledge and methods that are not these, as Franciscan, 
referencing the medieval monks Dominic and Francis. By utilizing these types she is seeking to 
broadly outline two different methodologies, but not to pit them against each other. The goal is 
that both Dominican and Franciscan methods might be used to reach a fuller, more robust 
account of reality. 
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 In detailing her view of this Franciscan knowledge Stump begins by describing many of 
the current theories of knowledge. She suggests these theories all characterize knowledge as a 
“matter of having an attitude toward a proposition, of knowing that.”36 There are examples of 
knowledge, however, which do not seem to be reducible to propositional knowledge, such as 
sensory knowledge. While propositional accounts can convey something about the color red, a 
propositional account cannot adequately provide answers to questions like “what is redness?” or 
“what is it like to see red?”37 Along with sensory knowledge, Stump suggests that there is a 
knowledge of persons that, similarly, cannot be reduced to propositional knowledge; both 
sensory knowledge and the knowledge of persons can be seen as subsets of Franciscan 
knowledge. 
 Consider a situation in which there is a woman Mary who has been locked away from 
human contact since birth and, though she has access to any and all information regarding the 
world and science, has only ever had third-person experiences or received third-person accounts. 
She knows everything that can be propositionally known of persons but has never had any sort of 
interaction with another person which could constitute a second-person experience (which 
includes narrative and story). After some time Mary is rescued from this imprisonment and 
reunited with her mother. “When Mary is first united with her mother, it seems indisputable that 
Mary will know things she did not know before, even if she knew everything about her mother 
 
36 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 49. 
37 Even in cases in which a proposition can result, such as “that appears red-ly to me,” or “that seems to be 
a red house,” etc., the point is that this does not exhaust what is actually known; red is not reducible to these 
propositions. Though this distinction may not be novel and may seem trivial, I do not to believe this to be the case, 
as I hope to display as we move forward. In some part this is because, as I stated earlier, I am trying to shift focus 
from the propositional conclusion (such as “that seems to be a red house,”) to the process/experience in which we 
receive the knowledge; it is in the actual experience and the things involved in the experience that we find the 
evidentially significant material. 
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that could be made available to her in non-narrative propositional form, including her mother’s 
psychological states… what will come as the major revelation to Mary is her mother.”38 
 A brief look at the nature of autism can help display this knowledge of persons and what 
its absence looks like. “Whatever ties together the different clinical signs of all the degrees of 
autism spectrum disorder, the most salient feature of the disorder is its ‘eerie imperviousness,’ its 
absence of acting in concert.”39 Stump’s assertion is that what is lacking in such individuals is a 
knowledge of persons and their mental states. 
 The current research on mirror neurons seems to suggest that the mirror neuron system is 
“the foundation for the capacity of all fully functional human beings at any age to know the mind 
of another person.”40 There is considerable research indicating that some of the knowledge 
gained in the interaction of persons is not only the result of a process of reasoning, but is a sort of 
experiencing in the mind of the actions or intentions of the other person as the other is 
experienced. “John knows that Mary is going to give him a flower because he first knows Mary, 
her action, her emotion, and her intention—but these are things which he knows by, as it were, 
seeing them, and not by cognizing them in the knowledge-that way.”41 
 In interactions between persons there is more occurring than what can be propositionally 
captured. Each individual as experienced (i.e. Mary’s mom, from the above example) is more 
than the sum of the propositional knowledge about them (i.e. all of the information Mary had 
about her mom prior to meeting her mom). Stump does, as mentioned above, extend this beyond 
 
38 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 52. 
39 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 65. 
40 Ibid., 68. 
41 Ibid., 71. 
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persons, but it is with knowledge of persons that she is primarily concerned. As has been 
referenced, though not spelled out, an interaction which yields this Franciscan knowledge will 
typically be of a second-personal nature.  An individual has an experience with another 
individual. When a second-person encounter occurs, one is placed in position to gain knowledge 
of persons of the sort being indicated in this section. 
Though an account of this experience (given its nature) cannot be propositionally 
provided, it does not follow that no account is possible. It is also worth noting that a given first- 
or third-person account would be insufficient to convey the knowledge which is at stake here. 
What is needed is a vehicle such as narrative or story. A story or narrative enables the listener or 
reader to have a part of what would have been had if this individual had undergone the second-
person experience but without actually being a direct participant in the experience.42 
 Though Stump’s Franciscan knowledge functions in many ways as a negative thesis (i.e. 
Franciscan knowledge is defined as knowledge which is not propositional) it is very natural and 
intuitive as is well illustrated through the autism example. Though it may be difficult to spell out 
what I know when I know that you are in a bad mood or being sarcastic, we fully understand 
what it looks like when someone is not picking up on these things or unable to grasp them. 
Stump compares Franciscan knowledge to perception; it is possible to be wrong in what one 
sees, as in a mirage or having an injury to the eye. However, we understand that these are 
illusions and exceptions and they can be disambiguated from perception when it is functioning 
normally.43 And so Stump says, “… Franciscan knowledge could be understood as the veridical 
delivery of a cognitive faculty when that cognitive faculty is aimed at veridicality and is 
 
42 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 78. 
43 Ibid., 74. 
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functioning properly in its typical environment where veridicality is a matter of an epistemic 
connection to things in the world that is correct and reliable but that is nonetheless not 
propositional.”44 
 
Expansive Epistemology Considerations 
Regarding our epistemological considerations some important points can now be made. 
Two things are needed: to show where there may be limits to propositional knowledge and to 
show the utility of an expansive epistemology. It is quite clear that Stump is arguing for an 
increased awareness and utility of non-propositional knowledge, or Franciscan knowledge. She 
emphasizes at many points that this is not to decry or subtract from propositional knowledge; 
propositional knowledge has much to contribute to philosophy and epistemology. However, for 
some enterprises within philosophy, such as Stump’s work on the problem of suffering, this non-
propositional knowledge has something important to offer. As I have suggested above, when 
working with philosophy of religion and ethics (at minimum), personal and experiential angles 
on knowledge are important and useful. Stump’s categories and negative thesis provide tools for 
trying to identify problem areas, especially when it comes to apprehending knowledge of 
persons. 
 Both authors clearly place a heavy emphasis on the role of experience and interpersonal 
relationships in knowledge. Newman has similar things in mind in relation to the limits of 
propositional knowledge, which is most evident in his clarification of formal inference. 
Interestingly, the categories of “notional” and “real” do not strictly line up with Dominican and 
Franciscan knowledge as may seem to be the case initially. This is because the categories of 
 
44 Ibid., 72f. 
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notional and real primarily have to do with the individual’s apprehension of a given object or 
proposition, etc. and is not something inherent within the proposition, whereas Dominican 
knowledge is defined as propositional and Franciscan knowledge is not propositional. However, 
there are resonances and at least some important overlaps; we are more likely in Dominican 
methods to apprehend notionally and in Franciscan methods to apprehend really. At least, such 
seems to be the case on my understanding of these two authors. In a very rough comparison, 
formal inference is a process which leads to Dominican knowledge and informal inference may 
lead to Franciscan knowledge; at the same time, often the conclusions of either process can be 
stated propositionally (in the case of Franciscan knowledge, it is just that the proposition does 
not contain all of the relevant information—there is more known, or what is known is more 
deeply known, than what the proposition conveys).45 
 And so, both Stump and Newman have delineated places in which propositional 
knowledge or formal inference ends, and both have linked this to religious issues; for Stump the 
answer to the problem of suffering is not merely propositional but involves, to some extent, a 
knowledge of persons. For Newman, matters of belief and even apprehending who God is come 
about largely through informal inference, and so regarding religious belief he says, “Persons 
 
45 The situation is, of course, more nuanced than this: For Newman, rather than differentiating between 
propositional and non-propositional knowledge (e.g. “I know that I will die,” and “I know I am about to die”) as it 
relates to a statement of knowledge, it seems he had more in mind a situation in which the proposition “I know that I 
will die,” might be apprehended in two different modes. In the first mode the statement is notionally apprehended 
and may be little more than comprehension; in the second mode of apprehending the statement, it is apprehended in 
a “real” way—(that is, in an experiential way that goes beyond the proposition in some way; there is something 
visceral and tangible). However, Newman would see both of these as the product of informal inference: “The 
strongest proof I have for my inevitable mortality is the reductio ad absurdum… But what logic cannot do, my own 
personal reasoning, my good sense, which is the healthy condition of such personal reasoning, but which cannot 
adequately express itself in words, does for me, and I am possessed with the most precise, absolute, masterful 
certitude of my dying some day or other” (Newman, Grammar of Assent, 197). For Stump, it would seem that the 
first statement above regarding my death could be propositionally understood and seen as the conclusion of an 
inductive argument while the second may allow for a non-propositional Franciscan understanding in which one is 
realizing the frailty of his life. 
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influence us, looks subdue us, deeds inflame us. Many a man will live and die upon a dogma: no 
man will be a martyr for a conclusion.”46 
 To our second aspect of where the expansive epistemology functions or is useful, the 
most direct answer is in personal knowledge. This is, however, not just the knowledge of persons 
which Stump argues for, but also a certain knowing as persons, both of which will be fleshed out 
further in the following chapter. Non-propositional knowledge is clearly more than just 
knowledge of persons, but it is certainly not less. As the moral argument for God’s existence is a 
field in which inter-personal relationships are critical, so far shall personal knowledge be of 
relevance as evidence in need of explanation. 
 By expansive epistemology, then, is meant an epistemological system which considers 
non-propositional evidence no less than propositional. When one approaches an issue with an 
expansive enough epistemology, one is beginning open to the deliverances of a wider range of 
input. This does not negate the requirement of truth inherent within any proper conception of 
knowledge but acknowledges the fullness of reality. When one thinks about the existence of 
God, one is interested in truth in the concrete, not just in the abstract. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has laid out the relevant epistemological details of Newman’s Grammar of 
Assent and Stump’s Wandering in Darkness with special attention to highlighting the limits of 
propositional knowledge and at least gesturing toward the nature of non-propositional 
knowledge. The following chapter will consist of an attempt to narrow in on some important 
 
46 Ibid., 62. 
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considerations regarding persons and personal knowledge to prepare us for approaching moral 
arguments for theism. 
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“No one, no one in the whole world, is unhappier than you are right now!” [Sonya] exclaimed, 
as if in a frenzy, not hearing [Raskolnikov’s] remark, and suddenly burst into sobs, as if in 
hysterics. 
 A feeling long unfamiliar to him flooded his soul and softened it all at once. He did not 
resist: two tears rolled from his eyes.…”47 
 
Chapter Three: Personalism and Personal Knowledge 
 
Personalism as a Philosophical Perspective and the Dignity of Persons 
 
Personalism 
 
 Issues of religious belief, morality, and ethics are issues of persons and between persons. 
It is not my wife or father or best friend who must decide whether I will profess belief in God or 
whether I should steal or lie. In doing these things, I am also dealing with persons and as a 
person. At least within Christian religious tradition, God is seen as personal though not 
necessarily a person (at least in our normal understanding of the term), and so my decision to 
believe in God would include some element of expecting or engaging in personal interaction 
with God. If I lie or steal, there is someone48 to whom my actions are directed. And so personal 
encounters are of paramount importance for this project and require some additional 
development.  
This will not be all, however; it is also important to consider what it means that we, as 
persons, encounter the world. What I mean is that each of us in virtue of being a person 
experiences the world in particular and individual ways; there are things about us and our 
backgrounds that affect our perspectives. There is also something to the reality that I learn things 
in virtue of being a person and not an animal, robot, lampshade, for example. I, as a person, am 
somehow active in the world in a way that non-persons are not. Therefore, vital to the issues of 
 
47 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 412. 
48 Excluding perhaps cases in which one is stealing from an entity, i.e. “the state.” 
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religious belief, morality, and ethics is knowledge of persons as well as knowing as persons. This 
chapter aims to develop each of these ideas, beginning with a discussion of the nature of 
personhood and ending with a narrative example in which I seek to display these ideas. 
Personalism has been a response in some ways similar to what I am seeking to display 
with epistemology. Crosby describes the rise of personalism as a reaction to some extent to “a 
reductionistic, naturalistic image of man.”49 Personalists in response seek to assert the value and 
dignity of persons—that there is something more to a person than propositional accounts. A 
person is neither exhaustively contained in scientistic, reductionist accounts nor subsumed within 
a pantheistic Hegelian system. I am not just a part or moment—I am something distinct, unique, 
and incommunicable.50 
While discussing his personalist work, Karol Wojtyla says: “The evil of our times 
consists in the first place in a kind of degradation, indeed a pulverization, of the fundamental 
uniqueness of each human person…. To this … we must propose, rather than sterile polemics, a 
kind of ‘recapitulation’ of the inviolable mystery of the person.”51 Here in Crosby’s explanations 
of personalism we see a similar awareness of the space in which an expansive epistemology is 
needed and useful. It is the awareness of something that will not be contained by our attempts to 
narrowly define and explain. 
 
49 Crosby, Personalism of John Henry Newman, xix. 
50 Ibid., xix-xx. That such a proposition can be formulated (“I am something distinct, unique, and 
incommunicable”) does not undercut the point; it simply means the conclusion is to some extent propositional and 
the concepts are analyzable. What it is that is actually known in knowing a person, however, is not so easily 
encapsulated. 
51 Quoted by Henri DeLubac, At the Service of the Church (San Francisco: Ignatius Books, 1993), 172, 
formatted here as referenced by Crosby, Personalism of John Henry Newman, xix. 
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Another important personalist principle is the subjectivity of persons, which has been 
developed and influenced by Max Scheler, Karol Wojtyla, and John Crosby, among others. A 
person lives, acts, and experiences the world “from within,” in a first-person perspective, as it 
were. To understand persons then requires something more than viewing them “from without.”52 
As an extension of this point, a person cannot be narrowed down to simply another instantiation 
of a human being; rather, as a subjective being, “a creature of interiority,” a person “exists as this 
unrepeatable person and so stands in a sense above the human kind, being always more than an 
instance of it.”53 
 
The Dignity of Persons 
 
 A chapter in John Crosby’s Personalist Papers develops an understanding of the sources 
for the dignity of persons.54 By “dignity” he means something different from the rights of a 
person. Personal dignity is not concerned with a social dimension the way rights are. I cannot 
violate my own rights, though others can; personal dignity, however, can be violated by myself 
and others. Personal dignity is also inalienable in a way rights are not. “… I can suspend or block 
my rights as a morally relevant factor in a given situation. But I cannot remove my dignity from 
a moral situation in this way.”55 
 Crosby sees the sources for the dignity of persons as twofold. The first is rationality. A 
significant part of the philosophical tradition of the West lends support to the idea of the dignity 
 
52 Crosby, Personalism of John Henry Newman, xx. 
53 Ibid., xx-xxi. 
54 John F. Crosby, Personalist Papers (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 
2004). 
55 Ibid., 4. 
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of the rational characteristics of human beings beyond that of all other creatures. Mankind “is not 
just governed by reason but governs himself with his own reason.”56 This is a fairly 
uncontroversial point and is of great value for our understanding of persons. As Crosby 
continues to point out, however, if this is our only source for the dignity of persons, this suggests 
that one may be able to argue (in contrast to the personalist themes noted above) that in sharing 
in the common source of dignity that is rationality, each person is just one additional instance of 
a rational human being.  
If my dignity rests in the idea that I am rational just as are all other instances of human 
beings, then I could be replaced by another human being sharing in that same rationality without 
anything of significance being lost. Indeed, to some extent, this is exactly what Peter Singer 
suggests in his work Practical Ethics. Since Singer is utilitarian in his ethical views, if a 
hemophiliac infant interferes with the potential for its parents to have a subsequent healthy 
infant, it would be morally justifiable to kill the hemophiliac infant.57 As Crosby emphasizes, 
without another source of dignity than rationality, it is not clear how one could adequately or 
decisively respond to this view.58 
It is worth pausing at this point to reflect on why we might find ourselves desiring to 
disagree with Singer’s conclusion to begin with. Is it self-evident that we should not kill infants? 
Singer himself points out that the current attitude toward infanticide is based on Christian 
principles and influence “rather than a universal ethical value,”59 and that many varied societies 
 
56 Crosby, Personalist Papers, 6. 
57 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 169ff. 
58 Crosby, Personalist Papers, 9f. 
59 Singer, Practical Ethics, 172. 
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in the past (Australian aborigines, ancient Greeks, and mandarin Chinese, for example) have seen 
infanticide as permitted or even obligatory.60 Singer is not trying to say infants can or should be 
killed for any reason or even to equate abortion and infanticide (the context of the infanticide 
issue is a discussion of abortion). Rather, he is suggesting that there is no intrinsic difference 
between the ethical situations of the two scenarios (neither the unborn child nor the infant is 
developed enough to have desires) and that in both cases it is permissible to kill the child 
provided “those closest to the child do not want it to live”61 (presumably for utilitarian reasons). 
So what is the impulse to disagree with this that many have? Is it only because we have received 
a Christian heritage and thus have been conditioned into moral outrage? 
Crosby would say no to this—there is a second source of dignity. “Each human being, 
besides sharing in this common nature [rationality], also has something of his own—something 
his own and not another’s—incommunicably his own.”62 There is something unique and 
unrepeatable about each person. Here we see another relation to the expansive epistemological 
concerns—as with our understanding of knowledge, there is something about persons that cannot 
be fully expressed, confined, or cornered. 
Crosby uses the example of Socrates to demonstrate this point. As far as qualities are 
concerned, there are of course commonalities of Socrates with others. Other persons have been 
human beings, Greeks, philosophers, and even ironic in a “Socratic” way. “But those who knew 
and loved Socrates will not grant that everything that they knew and loved in him can be 
repeated in others; they will insist that there was in Socrates something absolutely unrepeatable, 
 
60 Singer, Practical Ethics, 172. 
61 Ibid., 173. 
62 Crosby, Personalist Papers, 7. 
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they will say that there was a mystery of the man and that Socrates was not a mere instance or 
specimen of this mystery but that he was this mystery, so that another Socrates is strictly, 
absolutely impossible…. The incommunicable Socrates was something ineffable, something too 
concrete for the general concepts of human language; something knowable through love but not 
utterable in concepts.”63 On Crosby’s conception of things, then, the dignity of persons resides 
both in their common rationality and their individual incommunicability. 
 
Knowledge of Persons 
 
 Having set a foundation regarding the nature of persons (albeit briefly), we will now turn 
to the nature of knowledge of persons. Eleonore Stump has helpfully broken down the types of 
encounters in which she believes knowledge of persons to result: second-person experiences. 
Crosby has also explored some relevant themes, again within his Personalist Papers, where he is 
concerned with examining the nature of empathy and its role in interpersonal communication. 
 In the previous chapter we looked at Eleonore Stump’s account of Franciscan knowledge 
and personal knowledge, which is a subset of it. Much of the intention then was to point toward 
this non-propositional knowledge, for instance the kind of knowledge of another person that is 
often lacking in the encounters of autistic individuals with others. On Stump’s view, this type of 
knowledge of persons happens primarily or at least most obviously in the context of a second-
person experience.64 For instance, in our example using Mary and her mother from the previous 
chapter, what was needed for Mary to allow her the opportunity for the knowledge of persons 
that she could not get propositionally was that she encounter or experience her mother. 
 
63 Crosby, Personalist Papers, 11-12. 
64 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 75ff. 
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 In order to further clarify what a second-person experience is and how it differs from a 
first or third-person experience, Stump describes things in the following way: “One person Paula 
has a second-person experience of another person Jerome only if (1) Paula is aware of Jerome as 
a person (call the relation Paul has to Jerome in this condition ‘personal interaction’), (2) Paula’s 
personal interaction with Jerome is of a direct and immediate sort, and (3) Jerome is 
conscious.”65 Second-person experiences require, as one would expect, at least two individuals 
and the one having the experience must have personal interaction with that other, to see them “as 
a person.” Jerome has to be conscious, but not necessarily conscious of Paula. For Stump, this is 
the bare minimum for a second-person experience, and she finds that this definition of a second-
person account is a more accurate conception than that of first and third-person attempts to 
describe the same phenomenon.66 When I say, then, that when Paula and Jerome interact and 
Paula learns something about Jerome that is not propositional, I am trying to convey something 
like the idea that she has had a second-person experience of Jerome.  
Crosby, in his second chapter of Personalist Papers, entitled “The Empathetic 
Understanding of Other Persons,” also provides some helpful thoughts related to the knowledge 
of persons. Building upon the foundation of the incommunicability of other persons and their 
subjectivity, he draws attention to the hiddenness between persons that occurs as a result. This 
hiddenness of subjectivity provides an obstacle for knowing a person as a person; however, 
Crosby does not believe that it prevents the ability to encounter other persons.67 He writes, “It 
would seem that, though we can never experience them exactly as they experience themselves, 
 
65 Ibid., 75-76. 
66 Ibid., 77. 
67 Crosby, Personalist Papers, 34. 
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we can nevertheless understand what it is like for them to experience what they experience and 
in this way we can achieve a certain solidarity with them. I refer to the act of empathetically 
understanding others.”68 
This seems to overlap well with Stump’s understanding of mirror neurons and autism 
discussed previously: there are things we know about the other person because we are 
experiencing it from within ourselves in a way, and this provides a foundation of understanding. 
As she points out, the research is suggesting and indicating that this “experiencing of the other 
from within” is not the result of cognitive processes, of a chain of reasoning. Through empathy, a 
sort of “entering into a person subjectively,” our knowledge of the other person is enlarged—we 
have a path through the subjective hiddenness that is characteristic of each individual being an 
incommunicable person.69 
A second-person experience, then, and especially an empathetic understanding, can 
provide the framework in which knowledge of persons can occur. At most, this only provides us 
with a way of characterizing the situation in which the knowledge might occur, but it so far does 
not provide us with any indication of its content. It should be obvious that some of this content 
will be propositional, but my argument is that at least some of it is not. What is propositional can 
be easily analyzed and the content expressed and so that will not be of direct relevance here, but 
what shall we do with the things which are not propositional? How shall we give an account of 
them? 
This is where Stump’s concept of second-person accounts comes into the picture. Since 
second-person experiences differ from first- and third-person experiences (which might be more 
 
68 Ibid., 36. 
69 Ibid., 39. 
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easily conveyed in propositional format), first- and third-person accounts are also not sufficient. 
Stump asserts that what allows us to overcome the difficulties of expressing the second-person 
account are stories or narratives. “The re-presenting of a second-person experience in a story 
thus constitutes a second-person account. It is a report of a set of second-person experiences that 
does not lose (at least does not lose entirely) the distinctively second-person character of the 
experience.”70 For this reason, we will return at the end of this chapter to a narrative to attempt a 
better illustration of a second-person experience and gesture at the knowledge of persons being 
conveyed. 
 
Knowing as Persons 
 
 Not only is there knowledge of persons, but there is also a way of knowing as persons. 
For this we can think back to Newman’s illative sense as well as focus on the idea of experience. 
It is not necessary to pull in all of Newman’s characterization of the illative sense, but it at least 
provides an instructional way of thinking about how we approach the world. Every person is 
unique in his personality, in his psychological makeup, in his past experiences, in his particular 
giftings and skills. The combination of these characteristics reveals a unique, incommunicable 
person who interacts with the world as himself and no other. In his sermon “Implicit and Explicit 
Reason,” Newman writes: 
The mind ranges to and fro, and spreads out, and advances forward with a 
quickness which has become a proverb, and a subtlety and versatility which baffle 
investigation. It passes on from point to point, gaining one by some indication; 
another on a probability; then availing itself of an association; then falling back 
on some received law; next seeing on testimony; then committing itself to some 
popular impression, or some inward instinct, or some obscure memory; and thus it 
makes progress not unlike a clamberer on a steep cliff, who, by quick eye, prompt 
hand, and firm foot, ascends how he knows not himself; by personal endowments 
and by practice, rather than by rule, leaving no track behind him, and unable to 
 
70 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 78. 
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teach another. It is not too much to say that the stepping by which great geniuses 
scale the mountains of truth is as unsafe and precious to men in general, as the 
ascent of a skillful mountaineer up a literal crag. It is a way which they alone can 
take; and its justification lies in their success. And such mainly is the way in 
which all men, gifted or not gifted, commonly reason,—not by rule, but by an 
inward faculty. 
 Reasoning, then, or the exercise of Reason, is a living spontaneous energy 
within us, not an art.71 
 
 The point that I would like to make here is not concerning a new form of knowledge that 
is only obtained as persons, but rather that there is something distinctive and important about 
being persons which affects our knowing things. As Newman has expressed, there is something 
obscure and difficult to trace in the way the mind moves through premises and conclusions—this 
is, at least in part, a consequence of the incommunicability and uniqueness of persons. This 
becomes especially evident when the things we are discussing are real, rather than notional—
experiential rather than abstract. When the thing one is trying to know is objective, is abstract 
and notional, anyone can follow the premises and find the conclusion. But when one is trying to 
conclude on something real, something from experience, it is far more difficult for someone else 
to climb that mountain the same way.  
 Experience is the most important aspect of this. We experience the world. We experience 
people and values. We gain knowledge from this. This is not to say that one cannot state 
propositionally what it is that she has learned, but stating propositionally what she has learned is 
not the same thing as what she learned. If she goes out into the world and learns about morality 
and about suffering, she may be able to sit down and write out a propositional account of the 
lessons she learned—“I know that taking care of my family is a good thing”; “I know that 
actions have consequences”; or so forth. Knowledge of persons and knowing as persons is 
 
71 John Henry Newman, Fifteen Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford, Between A.D. 1826 
and 1843, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 176. 
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emphasizing something different, though. These propositions are not the things that change us, 
that bring us to realizations, that result in a real apprehension and assent to truths. One can state 
a thing propositionally all day long, for years and years, but until she knows it as a person (which 
often occurs in second-person experiences), she does not know it in the same way. Let us see if a 
story can more clearly convey this. 
 
Marmeladov and Sonya 
 
As indicated above, it is very important to remember that not everything occurring within 
a second-person experience or within our experience of the world as persons is non-
propositional. There will be aspects of things that can be conveyed propositionally and are 
useful. When Jerome smiles and Paula notices the smile, sees his eyes and the contours of his 
face, and concludes that Jerome is happy, she can say something like “I know that Jerome is 
happy.” There is always more nuance to this, of course, since to some extent, emotions are not 
always so neat and clear, but the idea remains. We can often propositionally convey parts of the 
second-person experience. When I learn the value and utility of perseverance from overcoming 
various challenges and seeing the fruit of that, I can state, “I know that perseverance is an 
important value.” However, we cannot convey everything, and it may just be that those things 
that we cannot convey propositionally are nonetheless true—and still things we know—and that 
they are valuable for understanding ourselves and the world. 
 In Crime and Punishment, we read of Semyon Marmeladov, a drunkard who has 
squandered all of his money and led his family into impoverishment; these actions caused his 
daughter Sonya (the same Sonya mentioned above as the eventual confidant to Raskolnikov) to 
have to go into prostitution in order to provide money for their family to live. As Marmeladov is 
dying the following scene occurs: “But with an unnatural effort he managed to prop himself on 
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one arm. He gazed wildly and fixedly at his daughter for some time, as though he did not 
recognize her. And indeed he had never seen her in such attire. All at once he recognized her—
humiliated, crushed, bedizened, and ashamed, humbly waiting her turn to take leave of her dying 
father. Infinite suffering showed in his face… “Sonya! Daughter! Forgive me!” he cried.”72 
 What is it that is happening in this scene? By Stump’s and Newman’s lights Marmeladov 
has a second-person experience of Sonya, and there is a sort of real apprehension occurring. He 
is seeing her garbed as a prostitute. There is of course grief and suffering, but what is it that he 
knows? He knows something deep and disturbing within him which forces him to cry out for 
forgiveness. Does he just know the propositions “It is wrong to be a drunkard” and “It is wrong 
to force my daughter into prostitution due to my drunkenness”? I do not think this narrative 
moment can be so encapsulated, and, even if it were, these propositions lose what is valuable in 
the knowledge. Indeed, Marmeladov himself is already aware of both propositions before this 
scene.  
In chapter two of part one of the book, Marmeladov tells Raskolnikov the full story of 
how Marmeladov and his family came to be in the situation they are in, including about Sonya. 
Marmeladov, in telling this, is fully aware of the wrongness of what he is doing, saying, “I ought 
to be crucified, crucified on a cross, and not pitied! But crucify, O judge, crucify, and having 
crucified, pity the man!”73 These words are refer to his drunkenness and to what he has caused to 
Sonya. So the “infinite suffering” in his face, the cry of forgiveness, the moment captured in the 
above scene is not simply the knowledge of the wrongdoing captured in the propositions. It is the 
 
72 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 185. 
73 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 23. The full scene between Raskolnikov and Marmeladov 
encompasses all of chapter two of part one of the book. 
36 
 
 
 
moment of seeing Sonya, seeing her dressed as a prostitute, perhaps the situation of knowing he 
is dying, it is all these things and more, happening as they do at that moment, in that experience 
that form the moment and realization Marmeladov has. 
Here, Marmeladov has a second-person experience with Sonya; he sees what his actions 
have caused, manifested in all their gaudy glory. He is also encountering Sonya as a person; this 
is the conclusion of his journey, of his thoughts and actions, of his climbing the mountain. In this 
moment of realization, in this encounter, Marmeladov is learning so much more than just 
propositions. Now, in this particular case, to say that Marmeladov knows these propositions is to 
say something more than what is in the propositions. There is a knowledge of persons, something 
irreducible, something deeper in this knowledge, and significantly, it has a profound impact on 
Marmeladov as a person. 
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“But what I say is this: if one convinces a person logically that he essentially has nothing to cry 
about, he’ll stop crying. That’s clear. Or are you convinced that he won’t?” 
 “Life would be too easy that way,” Raskolnikov replied.74 
 
Chapter Four: Applications of an Expansive Epistemology to the Moral Argument for 
God’s Existence 
Introduction 
 In the last three chapters I have attempted to lay out an understanding of an expansive 
epistemology and specifically to indicate what this might look like in regards to knowledge of 
persons. I should now like to develop these ideas as they relate to the moral argument for theism. 
My intention here is to display the ways in which these expansive epistemological concerns can 
positively support a moral argument. 
 Moral arguments for theism have many angles and facets, but are, in general, arguments 
seeking to connect some aspect of morality or ethics to the existence of God. One theoretical 
form of the moral argument can be expressed in the following form:  
1. There are objective moral facts. 
2. God provides the best explanation of the existence of objective moral facts. 
3. Therefore, (probably) God exists.75 
There are, of course, those who do not believe in objective moral facts—perhaps because 
there is no personal or impersonal force or mind that can serve as the basis of moral facts.76 
 
74 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 424. 
75 C. Stephen Evans, “Moral Arguments for the Existence of God,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/moral-arguments-god/>. 
76 This is a simplification, of course; J. L. Mackie, for instance, does not believe there is an objective 
standard for morality but does believe there are first-order moral evaluations that can be made separate from the 
second-order denial of objectivity. 
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Though this is an important perspective to consider, space does not permit an extensive treatment 
in response to those who would deny objectivity to morality. What will be attempted is more in 
line with providing support to premise 2 of the argument above. Through discussion of various 
moral phenomena, I will seek to illustrate how these phenomena evidentially point to the 
existence of God. 
There is a helpful clarification from H. P. Owen that may obviate an initial objection 
regarding the movement from moral phenomena to the existence of God. In the world, we first 
encounter and experience people and their actions, and thus encounter moral claims and values 
as things which exist in themselves. Morality and moral facts or any objectivity they possess are 
pressed upon us with “their own distinctive meaning and validity.” 77 It is another step to see 
behind these things the hand of a Creator, One who is the source of all reality. What this 
illustrates is the difference between the “order of knowing” and the “order of being.” For the 
theistic philosopher, God is first in the order of being but not in the order of knowing. In our 
pursuit of knowledge, we know of and feel the effects of morality before we see from whom they 
are derived. In my moving from moral phenomena to the existence of God, I am seeking to 
illustrate that “what is first in the order of knowing is second in the order of being.”78 
Furthermore, as the abductive language above indicates, it is important to realize that I do 
not expect this argument to be deductive or irresistible. Religious belief, by its nature, is a 
personal act that each person makes for himself. As discussed previously, each person has his 
own history of knowledge and relevant experience which will come with him to the discussion. 
 
77 H. P. Owen, The Moral Argument for Christian Theism (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1965), 
34-35. 
78 Ibid. 
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While some theistic arguments, such as the cosmological argument, are more conducive to 
logical proof, I do not believe that the moral argument is best construed in this way. To clarify, 
this is not to say that logical proofs are not applicable or not useful (indeed we began the chapter 
with one), only that they may not be best suited to the task. 
We live in a world of experience, of phenomena, and as was discussed in chapter two, it 
is real apprehension which is best suited for reaching truth in the concrete. This is especially true 
when it comes to matters of goodness and beauty. If I desire truth about such realities, then I 
must have some experience of them; I must experience the world as it is and so have real 
apprehension of it. While the process may end in a conclusion that can be put in notional terms, 
in a proposition (for instance “Therefore, [probably] God exists”), it seems to be the case that 
much of the relevant information comes or is deepened as a result of my interaction as person 
with the world and/or a personal God. Much in this vein, A. E. Taylor writes, “But the force of 
this evidence will naturally be under-estimated by the thoughtless and the self-satisfied; one may 
doubt whether it is ever disclosed in its full strength to any man who has never from the bottom 
of his heart uttered the cry, ‘God be merciful to me a sinner.’”79 
 
The Moral Argument 
 
Conscience and Obligation 
 
 Conscience is, of course, one of the most obvious and historically rich moral phenomena. 
John Henry Newman in his An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent spends much of the fifth 
 
79 Taylor, A. E. Does God Exist? (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), 120-21. There are also 
resonances here with the work of Paul Moser and his concept of “Gethsemane Epistemology”; the context of the 
relationship between a person and God is Gethsemane and the conflict between the human and divine will. “Faith in 
God, then, is not a leap in the dark; instead it is the affirmative response to God of yielding oneself to (participating 
in) God’s experienced moral character and will. Clearly, such faith is no merely intellectual response of assent to a 
proposition”; Paul K. Moser, “Gethsemane Epistemology: Volitional and Evidential,” Philosophia Christi Vol. 14, 
No. 2 (2012), 263-274, doi: 10.5840/pc201214223. 
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chapter extending an argument from conscience. Conscience has two aspects: “a judgment of the 
reason and a magisterial dictate.”80 The judgment of the reason is akin to our sense of right and 
wrong while the magisterial dictate functions as a particular voice approving or disapproving of 
our actions. 
 Newman clarifies the nature of conscience: “Thus conscience has both a critical and a 
judicial office, and though its promptings in the breasts of the millions of human beings to whom 
it is given, are not in all cases correct, that does not necessarily interfere with the force of its 
testimony and its sanction to that testimony, conveyed in the feelings which attend on right or 
wrong conduct.”81 For Newman, we find in conscience a route to a real apprehension of God. 
Clearly Newman does not believe that everyone will interpret the evidence this way, but the 
point remains that it is possible. When one lives in the world, as a person, she experiences a 
sense known as conscience, which indicates to her what is right and wrong, and produces a 
judgment on her actions. 
 At least one aspect that points in the direction of theism is deliberation about the source 
of this phenomenon. Where does the sense of conscience come from? Why do we feel that some 
things are right, and some things are wrong? Why do we feel guilty for our actions (especially 
the ones that do not directly affect others)? In many cases this feeling of guilt goes beyond what 
is imposed on us by others or ourselves but has the character of some outside standard to which 
we are being held. Newman wants to suggest that all of these questions and factors points to a 
transcendent personal judge—a truth which is confirmed and then extended by special 
revelation. 
 
80 Newman, Grammar of Assent, 71. 
81 Newman, Grammar of Assent, 72. 
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 It is important to note the personal aspect of this. Our phenomenological experience 
suggests that feelings of obligation or guilt are always in relation to other persons. A stone does 
not hold me obligated to perform actions; I do not feel guilt from the sky.82 And so there seems 
to be some phenomenological evidence here supporting a personal transcendent judge. 
 Though there are various objections to accounts of conscience like the one just given, the 
Freudian objection that identifies conscience with the superego is likely the strongest. However, 
arguably the two should not be equated, and John Crosby has defended Newman’s conception of 
conscience against this objection. Crosby writes, “What Freud calls the superego is a pre-
personal and in many cases a depersonalized form of moral life, whereas what Newman calls 
conscience is an eminently personal form of moral life; therefore Newman’s conscience falls 
outside of the Freudian superego and cannot be reduced to it, or explained in the terms in which 
the superego can be explained.”83 
 Because conscience is internal and experienced separately by each individual there is 
room for others to come to different conclusions on the same evidence. It is intriguing, however, 
to note how well we understand the phenomenon of conscience. It is for good reason that its 
deliverances are taken to be instructive and powerful, and even for many to point to theism by 
their personal and poignant nature. In the fifth chapter of this work we will return to Crime and 
Punishment to explore this a little further. 
 
82 Even in such a case where one might feel guilt for mistreatment of the earth, I do not think it is because 
the trees themselves are holding him accountable, but possibly because the deliverances of conscience stricken him 
with this guilt or because he has personified the earth (i.e. “Mother Earth”) such that he believes the source of the 
guilt to come in this way. But even in this case, he is seeing nature in a personal rather than abstract way and my 
point holds. 
83 Crosby, Personalism of John Henry Newman, 204. 
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 Inextricably tied to conscience is moral law and moral obligation or duty. David and 
Marybeth Baggett write, “To have a moral obligation to perform an action is, among other things 
to be guilty for failing to perform it, perhaps to deserve censure of some sort for neglecting it. 
Binding, authoritative obligations seem to be real phenomena in need of robust explanations.”84 
 We recognize certain things that exert some sort of claim on us, a sense of duty. I ought 
not lie to or abuse my family; I ought to provide for my family, to look out for those in society 
around me; I ought to be good or just or loving or kind. Now, of course, this is not to say that 
everyone feels these claims or feels them to the same extent; it seems apparent, though, that 
obligations or duties of this sort affect many people. 
 It is not outside the realm of possibility to envision one who does not feel (or assent to) 
the claim to love truth or to be good. This in no way invalidates the claim itself. Owen, in his 
excellent discussion of this issue writes: 
An even stronger proof is afforded by the fact that values exert an obligation. 
Their obligatoriness is inexplicable unless they are personal. Platonic Forms 
could, perhaps, attract. But how could they impose an obligation? How could we 
be indebted to them? Why should the failure to enact them engender guilt? I can 
betray a person and I know that I deserve the guilt I feel. But I cannot see how I 
could betray values if they are impersonal. 
Personal theism gives the only explanation by affirming that value-claims inhere 
in the character and will of God. In rejecting them we do not merely reject an 
abstract good; we do not merely reject our own ‘good’ (in the sense of our ‘well-
being’); we reject the love which God is in his tri-une being.85 
 
 Much like Newman and the discussion of the internal view of conscience, the idea of 
outwardly imposed obligations, especially regarding values such as loving the good and truth, 
provides evidence in need of an explanation. Especially regarding the issue of obligations and 
 
84 David Baggett and Marybeth Baggett, The Morals of the Story: Good News About a Good God (Downers 
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2018), 52-53. 
85 Owen, The Moral Argument, 80. 
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values, Owen believes the argument to be more nearing a logical proof. Our next two moral 
phenomena to investigate will not follow this tactic, but will be focusing on much more 
phenomenological and personal evidence. 
 
Scripture 
 
 While the previous point related to general revelation, this next point moves into special 
revelation. General revelation provides an important starting place, especially since we have 
established that morality comes first in the order of knowing. Conscience and obligation are 
important aspects of this, though not the only direction in which things could be argued from 
general revelation. Nonetheless, the world as it exists today contains special revelation. Even if 
the deliverances of special revelation could not have been perfectly predicted by reason alone, if 
the special revelation is a plausible extension of what is found in general revelation and even 
serves as being evidentially significant in its own right, then we do a disservice to the pursuit of 
truth in ignoring what is here. 
 Significant portions of Scripture contain narrative (within the Old Testament: the so-
called “historical books,” and in the New Testament: the “Gospels” and “The Acts of the 
Apostles”). These narratives consist of some of the most timeless and pervasive stories in all of 
western culture. Some of the stories have parallels in other cultures (creation accounts or flood 
myths, for example). There is an argument that could be made for the transcendent and 
fundamental role these stories play—a function which is so psychologically deep, resting on 
foundational archetypes—that it is part of the framework of reality; the idea here is that the 
themes or ideas in these stories are not just interesting, but actually reflect something of how 
reality is constructed and how we experience it. Something of this sort is currently being argued 
and unpacked in clinical psychologist Jordan Peterson’s detailed psychological analysis of 
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Genesis, presented in lectures available online.86 On this view of the world, Scripture captures 
something accurately about how the world actually is and resonates deeply within us. This would 
seem to be apparent historically and is still the case in much of the world today (interestingly, not 
just in the West, either). 
 It will help to remember our earlier discussion of Stump and the knowledge of persons. 
This knowledge is most clearly visible in second-person experiences and it is only second-person 
accounts which seem to capture this. Narrative or story is the most obvious example of a second-
person account. And so for the portions of Scripture which are narrative, we are presented with 
an opportunity for a second-person experience. When one reads Scripture, he has the opportunity 
to experience something, possibly to have something of a second-person experience, to see 
portrayals of faith or love or evil or grace. It matters, of course, what the quality of the narrative 
is, and it also matters how the reader comes to the text. If he does not pay attention or if he 
distances himself with an overly critical and abstract mindset, if he pulls things apart, 
apprehending only notionally, or if he is too skeptical and doubtful—by all these means he adds 
difficulties to his encountering the text and engaging in a second-person experience. 
 This understanding of the second-person experience through narrative accounts is 
significant because this is a way through which so many people have come to religious belief. I 
am far from suggesting this as a proof in the traditional sense, but arguably it is evidence worthy 
of consideration. If someone has encountered God through Scripture in narrative format it may 
well be because something about God—about His personal nature—came through in the text. 
 
86 Jordan Peterson, “The Psychological Significance of the Biblical Stories: Genesis,” Jordan B Peterson, 
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL22J3VaeABQD_IZs7y60I3lUrrFTzkpat. 
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From our journey in unfolding expansive epistemological ideas and the knowledge of persons we 
have captured the gist of the framework within which such encounters might occur. 
 The most evident example of what I am trying to point to is the person of Jesus as 
exemplified in the Gospels. In reading the Gospels one comes face-to-face, as it were, with the 
person of Jesus. One learns something about who He is, one reads of His love of the sisters Mary 
and Martha, and their brother Lazarus; one reads of His compassion for tax collectors, outcasts, 
and prostitutes; one reads of His wisdom in teaching to crowds and to disciples; one reads of His 
humility and grace in bearing an undeserved cross. 
 Now it must be clarified that I do not suggest any of this in a vacuum. This argument, as 
moral arguments generally are, should be alongside other arguments for God’s existence. Their 
cumulative force becomes all the more powerful. An “argument from narrative” need not stand 
by itself from an argumentative standpoint. But the point is that, even before knowing it is true—
even in doubting—the reading of the narrative of Scripture can impress upon one that it is true 
(of course, one does at least need a premise that Scripture is possibly true, that the issue is one to 
be considered). Again, this is not a deductive logical argument. I am not saying if someone 
experiences Scripture and takes it to be true, then this automatically guarantees its truth in an 
objective sense. I am saying, however, that if one has a second-person experience, say, involving 
Jesus of Nazareth, and thereby arrives at knowledge of persons of this Jesus, and finds the 
account compelling and assents, she is justified in so doing. This should also be seen as working 
in conjunction with the foregoing accounts of conscience and obligation. It is not likely one will 
assent to such a belief without realizing the need for it—without being aware, in some sense, of a 
transcendent personal judge and the realization that she herself has missed the mark and is 
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accountable before this judge. It is often the encounter with the narrative, however, which 
provides the content for the belief. 
 This brings us close to the realm of “reformed epistemology,” especially the likes of 
Alvin Plantinga. Trent Dougherty and Christ Tweedt write, “According to Alvin Plantinga, when 
religious belief is produced by God in a religious believer in the right kind of way, the result is 
faith, which is an immediately justified (even more, a warranted) religious belief.”87 The point is 
that religious experience of this sort, specifically narrative, has the potential to bring about and/or 
support knowledge of the existence of God. This happens through apprehending something of 
who God is (especially his moral qualities, His being the Good), and on the basis of this 
knowledge, assenting (that is, professing belief). What happens in these encounters, as expressed 
in the previous chapter, though perhaps describable in a proposition (i.e. “I know that God 
exists”), is not reducible to that. There is more that occurs in the second-person experience 
provided by narrative than what can be propositionally described. Propositions, however, are still 
quite useful and serve an important role within religious belief, especially in the formation and 
reception of doctrine. Where the experience provides something concrete and real and is the 
foundation of most religious belief, the propositions (the notionally represented) provide the 
clarification and development of the content of religious belief. 
 
The Effect of Moral Exemplars and Personal Influence 
  
 The final moral phenomenon that we will discuss here is that of personal influence. John 
Henry Newman was a staunch advocate of the role of personal influence as a means of 
communicating moral truth (as well as a stellar example of such a thing in practice). The idea 
 
87 Trent Dougherty and Chris Tweedt, “Religious Epistemology,” Philosophy Compass 
(2015), 10: 547– 559. doi: 10.1111/phc3.12185. 
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here follows from much of our discussion of persons and knowledge of persons. As has been 
suggested throughout this work, the second-person experience is the best means of 
communicating knowledge of persons, and morality has to do primarily with relations among 
persons (including, as shown earlier, obligations or conscience, which can be seen as having 
their foundations in their relation to God). Thus, it should not come as a surprise that personal 
influence between individuals might be a potential source of communicating these moral truths. 
 Newman, in his sermon “Personal Influence, the Means of Propagating the Truth,” writes 
at length about the difficulties involved in truth being communicated and the advantages error 
has over it in terms of communicability. Notwithstanding, Newman writes that it is through holy 
exemplars, the virtuous, through whom moral truth is most emphatically and forcefully 
communicated, and this happens through their personal interactions in the world. Newman 
writes, “Men persuade themselves, with little difficulty, to scoff at principles, to ridicule books, 
to make sport of the names of good men; but they cannot bear their presence: it is holiness 
embodied in personal form which they cannot steadily confront and bear down: so that the silent 
conduct of a conscientious man secures for him from beholders a feeling different in kind from 
any which is created by the more versatile and garrulous Reason.”88 
 It is of course no revelation that many are converted to religious belief through personal 
influence, and therefore some disambiguation is needed here. (1) Not all those exerting personal 
influence have good intentions (i.e. not all are holy, to use religious language). In emphasizing 
personal influence as a means of conveying moral truth, we are restricting this to moral 
exemplars and thus ruling out charlatans, the charismatic but corrupt, and those who are not 
 
88 John Henry Newman, “Personal Influence, the Means of Propagating the Truth,” in Fifteen Sermons 
Preached Before the University of Oxford Between A.D. 1826 and 1843 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
72-73. 
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intentionally deceiving others but still not morally exemplary. The fact that personal influence 
can be captivating even when the influence is corrupt or ignorant illustrates the power of 
personal influence but does not negate the proper unfolding and living out of one who is a moral 
exemplar. And so there is an amount of discretion that must be taken. It is noteworthy that this 
discretion often happens naturally in personal relationships. What is primarily in mind with 
personal influence is personal one-to-one relationships or relationships within small 
communities, and not public speakers on stages. Charisma can overwhelm at a distance and with 
measured and honeyed words, but in close relationships such a façade is much more difficult to 
maintain. 
 (2) It is also important to note that the suggestion is not that the experience of personal 
influence immediately justifies itself and/or guarantees truth without the involvement of other 
premises. We will return to this objection in the following section, but a brief comment here will 
hopefully be illustrative. Personal influence is not just an experience—there is content involved: 
moral truth delivered in a knowledge-of-persons format. What happens is more along the lines of 
learning or understanding moral truths as communicated or embodied by a moral exemplar and 
this personal experience being confirmed or supported through one’s own experience or 
reflection. Conscience, obligation, narrative, and personal influence will generally all build and 
strengthen each other. 
 (3) We are generally able to discern what is true or not, to some extent, in personal 
encounters. In our relationship with another, we discern the rightness of this person’s love and 
kindness, the soundness of their wisdom, the wrongness of their manipulation, and so forth. This 
does not mean it is always clear or we are always right, but in general we can discern the 
difference between a rogue and a holy man. Our conscience speaks, our experience confirms. We 
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tend to pick up subtle cues regarding the genuineness of the individual and we also tend to 
attempt to verify through our conscience and experience of the world the validity of what the 
individual is communicating. 
 (4) Additionally, there is something especially distinct about the moral exemplar or holy 
man, as compared to others or even to “good” men. Newman writes, 
The men commonly held in popular estimation are greatest at a distance; they 
become small as they are approached; but the attraction, exerted by unconscious 
holiness, is of an urgent and irresistible nature; it persuades the weak, the timid, 
the wavering, and the inquiring; it draws forth the affection and loyalty of all who 
are in a measure likeminded; and over the thoughtless or perverse multitude it 
exercises a sovereign compulsory sway, bidding them fear and keep silence, on 
the ground of its own right divine to rule them,—its hereditary claim on their 
obedience, though they understand not the principles or counsels of that spirit, 
which is ‘born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, 
but of God.’89 
 
 So much for the nature of personal influence, but how does this relate to Christian 
theism? Surely there are examples of moral exemplars who were not theists or Christians, such 
as Socrates or Gandhi. This evidences our earlier distinction between the order of knowing and 
the order of being. Moral exemplars at least have a real and deep apprehension of morality, 
though some of them may not be aware of its source—that is, God. They recognize, they see the 
Good, but they do not see its source, they do not realize that “what is first in the order of 
knowing is second in the order of being.” 
 But it is significant that such a thing occurs, that there are individuals who so embody 
moral truths that their personal interactions transfix and awe us. It speaks of deep truths to reality 
about morality and the nature of things, as well as displays how personal these truths often are. 
 
89 John Henry Newman, “Personal Influence,” 74. 
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There is something different and powerful about a holy man exemplifying good as compared to 
our logical, abstract reflections on the good. 
 
Owen’s Objection 
 
 Though space may not allow for isolated treatment of objections, there is at least one 
important objection raised by H. P. Owen that we can unpack. Owen writes, 
The theist can attempt to prove the existence of a moral Absolute on the grounds 
of religious experience. The core of the argument is that the religious person feels 
himself to be in the presence of an ineffable, all-encompassing, mystery. Those 
who practise the ‘higher’ religions (pre-eminently Judaism and Christianity) 
interpret this mystery in terms of moral holiness. This experience guarantees the 
existence of its object. 
 The argument is invalid. The experience may be psychologically self-
authenticating to its possessors; but it is not logically so to the skeptic. All the 
skeptic needs to do is, firstly, to dispel the numinous element by the usual 
methods of reductionism, and secondly to show that what is left is a purely moral 
experience of an absolute (or at any rate very high) ideal which (for the reasons I 
have given) need not objectively exist.90 
 
 It should be first noted that Owen still believes a moral argument can be offered and is 
compelling, only that it will not take the form above, as being from religious belief. We have 
already quoted Owen in affirmation when we discussed obligations and especially of the sort that 
values seem to impose, so there is no need to deny what Owen seeks to show there. However, 
perhaps it remains useful to include religious belief in the category of evidence, especially in the 
form of the interaction of one with Scripture and the effect of personal influence. 
 The first thing we can note in response to Owen is that our goal with these latter two 
phenomena is not to assert so strong a conclusion as “This experience guarantees the existence of 
its object,” at least not in an objective sense. He is suggesting that such an idea is not logically 
compelling to the skeptic, but of course that is to be expected. As I have tried to make clear, I do 
 
90 Owen, Moral Argument, 76. 
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not believe that religious belief or experience is best explained or demonstrated in logical 
categories (though logic has its place and can still be quite useful in various roles with the moral 
argument, particularly in supportive roles of highlighting and displaying the consistency of 
different elements of the belief or defending their rationality). 
 The truth we are trying to investigate or ascertain is one relating to the existence of 
another being, of His being in the world and real. If He is real, I will meet Him best, apprehend 
Him most fully only in a real or experiential way, of the sort I am suggesting can occur through 
narrative and personal influence. These methods open the door for a personal encounter, a 
second-person experience. In saying that I know my wife, know she exists or her character, I will 
not find this truth most grounded, most real in my abstract mental reflections of her but rather in 
my real experience of her, here in the world.  
 For this reason, Owen’s criticisms utilizing the skeptic’s response seem to miss the point. 
I do not think dispelling the numinous element through reductionism succeeds in the way he 
suggests. The skeptic has not actually “dispelled” the numinous element of his own in any way 
but only dismissed another’s experience of the numinous. Since these truths are not deductive, of 
course you can dismiss someone else’s numinous experience and suggest that it is only a “moral” 
experience, but this does not impact the truth of the numinous experience in any way. I am 
saying that numinous experience is exactly the thing that is needed and powerful. Until the 
skeptic has undergone this himself, his criticisms have no power over the believer (and even 
when he has had some sort of experience, his judgments will not reach the believer since they 
will be different by virtue of the skeptic’s individual personality). To the extent that the skeptic 
attempts to dismiss the religious experience grounding or providing content to the believer, the 
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skeptic is attempting to reduce to the notional what is real in the believer, and this cannot be 
done—at least not in any way that is accurate. 
 With this objection addressed, we will return to Crime and Punishment in the next 
chapter, where I will seek to display what these expansive epistemological points look like in 
practice, so to speak. As expressed, the sorts of second-person encounters which lead to 
knowledge of persons are best expressed through narrative and story; hopefully, through 
encountering the narrative of Raskolnikov, we will be able to glimpse something of the moral 
argument for which I am arguing. 
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 As if forgetting herself, [Sonya] jumped up and, wringing her hands, walked halfway 
across the room; but she came back quickly and sat down again beside [Raskolnikov], almost 
touching him, shoulder to shoulder. All at once, as if pierced, she gave a start, cried out, and, not 
knowing why, threw herself on her knees before him. 
 “What, what have you done to yourself!” she said desperately, and, jumping up from her 
knees, threw herself on his neck, embraced him, and pressed him very, very tightly in her arms.91 
 
Chapter Five: Crime, Punishment, and Conclusions 
Raskolnikov’s Journey 
 Crime and Punishment is an exploration—a psychological exploration of one man and 
the consequences of his actions. Raskolnikov is on a journey, though primarily one of his mind 
and soul. In the first chapter we set up some details regarding the storyline, Raskolnikov’s inner 
conflict, and one of his haunting dreams. Having now laid out our epistemological 
considerations, personal knowledge, and developed this further in its relation to the moral 
argument, I would like to dig deeper into the story of Raskolnikov as it relates to these items. In 
Raskolnikov’s journey in Crime and Punishment, I see evidence of the points relating to the 
moral argument that I have introduced, and we have already touched on the usefulness of 
narrative in conveying knowledge of persons. We will begin by a discussion of the effect of 
conscience, and then the effect of Sonya on Raskolnikov, before attempting to identify a bit more 
closely the nature of Raskolnikov’s redemption. 
 
The Effect of Conscience 
 The role that Raskolnikov’s conscience plays is likely the most obvious and clear here 
within the work. Even the name “Raskolnikov” comes from Russian roots meaning “schism” or 
“to split.”92 Throughout the novel, Raskolnikov is plagued and tormented by his mind, which 
 
91 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 411. 
92 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, xx. 
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shows in dreams like the one mentioned in chapter one, fever and delirium, fainting (this 
happens in the police headquarters when he overhears the police talking about the murders), 
contemplation of suicide, and wavering between confessing and avoiding detection. It has been 
suggested that this internal conflict within Raskolnikov is presented externally by Dostoevsky in 
the characters of “Svidrigailov, epitome of self-willed evil, and Sonia, epitome of self-sacrifice 
and spiritual goodness.”93 
 Svidrigailov is an individual for whom Raskolnikov’s sister (Dunya) used to work (as a 
housekeeper, essentially) and who had become obsessed and enamored with Dunya. Svidrigailov 
is a selfish individual who seemingly has no real qualms about morality; he knows he is base but 
does not seem to be inclined to change (at one place he says, “I am indeed a depraved and idle 
person”94). He is also plagued by visions of his wife who recently died; it is never clearly 
established that he was a direct cause of her death, but he seems to be aware that he was not good 
to her (having constantly been involved in adulterous relationships) and may have played some 
role in the decline of her health.95 The visions he is having as well as recognition of his depravity 
link him to Raskolnikov, who has committed an evil act and is grappling with delirium and 
dreams (a connection even further emphasized if Svidrigailov did, in fact, kill his wife). 
Svidrigailov has apparently decided he does not want to change or that he cannot; he refuses to 
let go of his depraved nature—he refuses to repent. 
 
93 J. M. Beebe, “The Three Motives of Raskolnikov,” in Crime and Punishment and the Critics, edited by 
E. Wasiolek (San Francisco: Wadeworth, 1961). 
94 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 291. 
95 Raskolnikov’s sister, Dunya, does accuse Svidrigailov of having killed his wife by poison, though it is 
not confirmed by Svidrigailov; arguably, it is implied contextually by Dostoevsky that Svidrigailov did murder his 
wife. 
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 Sonya is a Christ-figure, an image of light and goodness, but one who has been 
circumstantially stained. Because of her drunkard of a father (Marmeladov), she has turned to 
prostitution in order to provide money for her family, who would starve otherwise and already 
cannot keep up payments for their lodging. She is humble and self-sacrificing, giving up 
everything, including her own innocence, to attempt to make a way for her family. When 
Raskolnikov finally confesses to Sonya what he has done, she explains to him what he must do 
in response: 
 “What to do!” she exclaimed, suddenly jumping up from her place, and 
her eyes, still full of tears, suddenly flashed. “Stand up!” (She seized him by the 
shoulder; he rose, looking at her almost in amazement.) “Go now, this minute, 
stand in the crossroads, bow down, and first kiss the earth you’ve defiled, then 
bow to the whole world, on all four sides, and say aloud to everyone: ‘I have 
killed!’ Then God will send you life again. … Accept suffering and redeem 
yourself by it, that’s what you must do.”96 
 
 In these two persons, we see personified some of the conflict Raskolnikov is facing. He 
can refuse repentance, like Svidrigailov, continuing on the path he is on; or he can repent, 
following Sonya’s directives. Svidrigailov seems to be aware of exactly this when he tells Sonya, 
“‘There are two ways open for Rodion Romanovich [Raskolnikov]: a bullet in the head, or 
Siberia.’”97 This is because Svidrigailov has apparently realized that he cannot defeat his 
conscience or live with himself, but he refuses to repent. Indeed, shortly following these 
statements to Sonya, he shoots himself in the head. 98 So the stage is set for Raskolnikov. He can 
 
96 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 420. 
97 Ibid., 500. 
98 To clarify, it is not explicitly stated in the text that Svidrigailov’s motive for the suicide is a direct 
consequence of his inability to live with his conscience; Svidrigailov makes one more attempt to persuade Dunya to 
be with him, and she rejects him. One interpretation may be that Svidrigailov kills himself in heartbreak over her 
rejection. While I believe this plays a part, I believe it is too simplistic to function as a full interpretation. Dunya’s 
rejection is in large part because of the character of Svidrigailov; she accuses him of killing his wife and labels him 
a scoundrel. She is rejecting him because he is not a good person, and he knows this. So while heartbreak is indeed a 
significant part of the cause of his suicide, I believe it also has to do with his awareness of the kind of man he is—he 
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decide to refuse repentance, though he will not be able to live with himself and the psychological 
conflict going on, or he can take the path of Sonya, taking upon himself a burden of suffering to 
serve others. 
 Some things can be noted regarding Raskolnikov’s conscience. Raskolnikov’s motives 
are only partially clear throughout much of the novel, but he seems to reveal most accurately his 
true motivations and thought process in this exemplary passage worth quoting at length: 
 “Be still, Sonya, I’m not laughing at all, I know myself that a devil was 
dragging me. Be still, Sonya, be still!” he repeated gloomily and insistently. “I 
know everything. I thought it all out and whispered it all out when I was lying 
there in the dark… I argued it all out with myself, to the last little trace, and I 
know everything, everything! … I wanted to kill without casuistry, Sonya, to kill 
for myself, for myself alone! I didn’t want to lie about it even to myself! It was 
not to help my mother that I killed—nonsense! I did not kill so that, having 
obtained means and power, I could become a benefactor of mankind. Nonsense! I 
simply killed—killed for myself, for myself alone—and whether I would later 
become anyone’s benefactor, or would spend my life like a spider, catching 
everyone in my web and sucking the life-sap out of everyone, should at that 
moment have made no difference to me!... And it was not money above all that I 
wanted when I killed Sonya; not money so much as something else… I know all 
this now… Understand me: perhaps, continuing on that same path, I would never 
again repeat the murder. There was something else I wanted to know: something 
else was nudging my arm. I wanted to find out then, and find out quickly, whether 
I was a louse like all the rest, or a man? Would I be able to step over, or not! 
Would I dare to reach down and take, or not? Am I a trembling creature, or do I 
have the right…” 
 “To kill? The right to kill?” Sonya clasped her hands.99 
 
 Raskolnikov lays it all out now; he wanted to know if he was a sort of Nietzschean 
übermensch. He wanted to know if he could step over conventions of right and wrong. 
Consequently, one objection regarding Raskolnikov’s conscience is that the torment he feels is 
not about remorse for his evil actions, but rather the pangs of his pride as he realizes that he is 
 
cannot live with himself because no one else can live with him. He has separated himself from humanity through his 
depravity. 
99 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 419. 
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not a man but a louse. Firstly, it can be noted that the conscience does not have to be infallible in 
its deliverances to be evidentially significant and so even if Raskolnikov’s conscience is 
bothering him regarding his pride rather than conviction of his guilt for his actions, his feelings 
of conscience are significant. Secondly, it is not necessary that the true nature of his conscience 
be transparent to himself. He could attribute the wrong source to the tormenting feeling he has. 
Thirdly, I do not think it is impossible to see here a combination of psychological factors. On my 
reading, it seems Raskolnikov is tormented in his conscience regarding his evil actions and also 
that his pride is deeply wounded because he is tormented by his conscience. The tormenting of 
his conscience is confirmation that he is not an ubermensch, not a “Napoleon”;100 a Napoleon has 
the right to step over morality by virtue of being such a person. This also provides a way of 
understanding why Raskolnikov is not completely remorseful; he still seems to believe his thesis 
about the ubermensch or Napoleon, but to realize that he is not one yet. And so his conscience is 
tormenting him, but he is not yet repentant. 
 
The Effect of Sonya 
 
 As noted, Sonya functions within the narrative as a Christ-like figure. Raskolnikov first 
learns of her and her circumstances through her father Marmeladov in the second chapter of the 
book. Then, after Marmeladov is seriously injured and dying, Raskolnikov sees her again at 
Marmeladov’s deathbed. The next day she shows up at Raskolnikov’s lodging (while 
Raskolnikov’s family is with him) to ask if he would join her and her family at a memorial 
dinner for Marmeladov. There is something strange and captivating in their encounter; 
Raskolnikov tells her he will come to see her soon. 
 
100 Throughout the book, Napoleon is used by Raskolnikov as an exemplar of a great man who steps across 
moral boundaries to do what is needed and is celebrated as a hero for doing so. 
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 Their first encounter alone is awkward in its beginning, as their connection is in regard to 
her father and that on a chance encounter Raskolnikov had with Marmeladov in a bar. 
Raskolnikov has already noted the strange childish innocence she has, her meager lodging, and 
knows that she is prostituting herself out in order to provide for her family. As their conversation 
develops, it regards her family mostly, and she displays an extraordinary amount of compassion 
and love for them, even blaming herself for minor things that she could have done better to love 
them. In a sort of mean way he presses on her the reality that her consumptive mother-in-law will 
likely die soon and her sister will then need to go into prostitution as well; when she protests that 
God would not allow it, he laughs and chides, “‘But maybe there isn’t any God.’”101 At this 
point, she breaks into tears and is silent for some minutes. Then, in a strange turn, he kneels 
before her and kisses her foot. 
 Raskolnikov, who is quite perceptive and intelligent, has apprehended Sonya for what she 
is: a humble, pure, self-sacrificial being willing to shoulder her cross of suffering in order to save 
her family. He is puzzled by her and says, “‘I said it of you not for your dishonor and sin, but for 
your great suffering. But that you are a great sinner is true.’”102 He presses into this, suggesting 
that she has destroyed herself through sin in vain because she will not end up saving anyone. 
“‘But tell me, finally,’ he spoke almost in a frenzy, ‘how such shame and baseness can be 
combined in you beside other opposite and holy feelings? It would be more just, a thousand 
times more just and reasonable, to jump headfirst into the water and end it at once!’ ‘And what 
would become of them?’ Sonya asked weakly…”103 And Raskolnikov sees it all, sees the 
 
101 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 321. 
102 Ibid., 322. 
103 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 322. 
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suffering that she has carried, sees the despair she has been through, the thoughts of suicide, the 
complete lack of concern for his cruel words. But he cannot understand her and how she is able 
to keep going. He is confused at why, in the midst of all of her shame and depravity, she would 
not turn to suicide as a better recourse. He saw that so far none of the depravity had actually 
reached her heart, but he did not believe it could last. 
 He realizes next that it is only through God that she has sustained herself through these 
trials and Sonya confirms this with cries that God “does everything.” “‘Here’s the solution…’ he 
decided to himself… ‘A holy fool!’”104 Raskolnikov notices the New Testament on her chest of 
drawers and asks her to read the story of Lazarus from the Gospel of John to him. Sonya’s 
reading of the passage is conveyed by Dostoevsky in astounding perception and poignancy, as 
Sonya is clearly envisioning Raskolnikov before her, knowing he is Lazarus needing to be raised 
from the dead. The reading of the passage ends in silence and Raskolnikov immediately begins 
on a new topic: “‘I left my family today,’ he said, ‘my mother and sister. I won’t go to them now. 
I’ve broken with everything there.’ … ‘I have only you now,’ he added. ‘Let’s go together… 
I’ve come to you. We’re cursed together, so let’s go together!’ … She went on looking at him, 
understanding nothing. She understood only that he was terribly, infinitely unhappy.”105 In the 
end, Raskolnikov prepares to depart, telling her that when he sees her next he will tell her who 
killed Lizaveta (the sister of the old crone). 
 Beyond being incredibly beautiful writing, this passage illustrates some very important 
points that I would like to highlight. (1) The passage shows how Sonya is beginning to form an 
impression on Raskolnikov; he calls her a “holy fool,” but he is also baffled and impressed by 
 
104 Ibid., 324. 
105 Ibid., 329. 
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her ability to carry on under the suffering she carries. Though she is in the midst of terrible 
circumstances, in which she has “killed herself” in a way through sacrificing her innocence, he 
sees her purity and love for her family, her self-sacrifice and suffering. Sonya is a moral 
exemplar, and her life, conveyed through her personal interaction with Raskolnikov has 
convinced him of her holiness though he seems to doubt the strength of her source (God). He is 
at least captured enough by her holiness, though, to indicate that he will confess something big to 
her (who killed Lizaveta), which, as we know, he does later in the book. 
 (2) Raskolnikov sees part of himself in Sonya; as noted above, he sees her as having 
“killed herself”: “‘You’ll understand later… Haven’t you done the same thing? You, too, have 
stepped over… were able to step over. You laid hands on yourself, you destroyed a life… your 
own (it’s all the same!).’”106 As noted earlier, Sonya represents one path for Raskolnikov—the 
path of repentance and bearing one’s own suffering for the sake of others’ well-being. He is 
drawn to her through her holiness and through his identification of their commonality in 
suffering. Svidrigailov has also (presumably) taken the life of his wife, and so Raskolnikov can 
identify with him as well, and find his other choice. 
 (3) Raskolnikov and Sonya participate in a narrative within the story—that of the raising 
of Lazarus. Of all passages, this is the one that Raskolnikov asks Sonya to read, and 
Dostoevsky’s text seems to indicate that they are both listening attentively in such a way as to be 
in position for a real apprehension of the text, a second-person experience. Does Raskolnikov 
identify himself with Lazarus?  
 We have already looked at many key passages from Raskolnikov’s later confession to 
Sonya; the passage regarding his motives earlier in the chapter takes place during the confession, 
 
106 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 329. 
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as well as the epigraph to this chapter, which I might recommend reading again at this point. 
Sonya never deserts Raskolnikov and consistently points him toward repentance and voluntary 
acceptance of his suffering, toward redemption. After he confesses his crime to the police and is 
sent to Siberia, she follows with him. She comes and sees him regularly, though he is often 
withdrawn and distant. She displays and embodies holiness and remains consistent over time 
without being overbearing. Her consistent holy example within his life is key for the redemption 
that is to come. 
 
Redemption 
 The moment of transformation—of redemption—comes at the very end of the book, in 
the last two pages. We will return to this moment shortly, but I would first like to clarify some of 
the steps leading to this one. First, Raskolnikov confesses to Sonya, as I have already mentioned. 
He finds in her a confidant to whom he can pour out his soul. Second, he does end up obeying 
her instructions of what he should do in response to his sin: bowing down in the Haymarket and 
kissing the ground as a symbolic apology to humanity (though he does not follow through with 
the public apology of “I have killed,” for after he sees people jeering he loses his nerve). Third, 
he goes through with his confession, though he loses his nerve here multiple times. In all of this, 
he is not yet repentant; in a conversation with Dunya after she understands what he has done 
(conveyed to her through Svidrigailov who overhead Raskolnikov’s confession to Sonya), 
Raskolnikov still defends his actions. I believe these three steps toward redemption are indicative 
of some level of guilt or remorse that he feels, of something within his conscience propelling him 
further, even though he is not actually repentant yet. 
 It becomes even clearer that he is not repentant after he is taken to Siberia. Raskolnikov 
is still divided within himself and removed from the rest of humanity. Sonya has followed him to 
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Siberia and comes to visit him, but he is cold and distant with her. The other inmates dislike and 
revile him, though they love Sonya. Dostoevsky writes, “‘You’re godless! You don’t believe in 
God!’ they shouted. ‘You ought to be killed.’ He had never talked with them about God or belief, 
but they wanted to kill him for being godless… Still another question remained insoluble for 
him: why had they all come to love Sonya so much?”107 Even without having to say anything to 
them, the inmates decry Raskolnikov, and he does nothing to respond because he seems to see it 
only from a distance, as a curiosity—he is not present to them. 
 After about nine months like this in Siberia, Raskolnikov gets sick. While he is sick, he 
has a dream, one that is haunting and stirring, though difficult to explain. Dostoevsky does not 
explain any direct meaning of it in the text, but it leaves a deep impression on Raskolnikov of 
which he cannot let go. The dream regards some sort of trichinae that lodge themselves within 
people, causing these people to go mad. However, these mad individuals become possessed of 
unshakeable certainty of their intelligence and grasp of the truth, such that their convictions and 
deliverances on all subjects seem to them incontrovertible. Dostoevsky describes this affecting 
nearly the whole world and the breakdown in society that occurs since no one can work together 
or get along together. Everything is dying and the pestilence spreads further. There are supposed 
to be some chosen people, pure and holy, responsible for bringing new life, but no one has seen 
or heard them. 
 Raskolnikov has this dream in his head and thoughts for the remainder of his illness. It is 
likely that much of the effect of the dream is implicit and experiential, not necessarily logical. 
Whatever it means exactly, we see the consequences soon after. Raskolnikov hears that Sonya is 
sick and becomes worried about her; she is not seriously ill, though, and lets him know she will 
 
107 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 546. 
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see him soon. Raskolnikov goes out with a guard and some other workers where they are 
working on baking gypsum. Raskolnikov escapes for a break, looking out over the steppe: 
Raskolnikov sat and stared fixedly, not tearing his eyes away; his thought turned 
to reverie, to contemplation; he was not thinking of anything, but some anguish 
troubled and tormented him. 
 Suddenly Sonya was beside him. She came up almost inaudibly and sat 
down next to him. It was still very early; the morning chill had not softened yet. 
She was wearing her poor old wrap and the green shawl. Her face still bore signs 
of illness; it had become thinner, paler, more pinched. She smiled to him amiably 
and joyfully, but gave him her hand as timidly as ever. 
 She always gave him her hand timidly; sometimes she even did not give it 
at all, as if fearing he might push it away. He always took her hand as if with 
loathing, always met her as if with vexation, was sometimes obstinately silent 
during the whole time of her visit. There were occasions when she trembled 
before him and went away in deep grief. But this time their hands did not 
separate; he glanced at her quickly and fleetingly, said nothing, and lowered his 
eyes to the ground. They were alone; no one saw them. The guard had his back 
turned at the moment. 
 How it happened he himself did not know, but suddenly it was as if 
something lifted him and flung him down at her feet. He wept and embraced her 
knees. For the first moment she was terribly frightened, and her whole face went 
numb. She jumped up and looked at him, trembling. But all at once, in that same 
moment, she understood everything. Infinite happiness lit up in her eyes; she 
understood, and for her there was no longer any doubt that he loved her, loved her 
infinitely, and that at last the moment had come… 
 They wanted to speak but could not. Tears stood in their eyes. They were 
both pale and thin, but in those pale, sick faces there already shone the dawn of a 
renewed future, of a complete resurrection into a new life. They were resurrected 
by love; the heart of each held infinite sources of life for the heart of the other. 
 …. he was risen and he knew it, he felt it fully with the whole of his 
renewed being.…108 
  
 Raskolnikov has a moment of transformation in a literary passage of unspeakable depth 
and beauty. This journey, this discussion through this whole paper, is exemplified in many ways 
through Raskolnikov’s journey in Crime and Punishment. 
 It is through his conscience that the first indications come, that the guilt begins to press 
on him. He is tormented and oppressed by the feeling that he has stepped over morality but 
 
108 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 549-550. 
64 
 
 
 
should not have.109 This is presented in dramatic and powerful form through the narrative but is a 
common phenomenon of human experience. Next, Raskolnikov encounters Sonya, who 
embodies Christ to him; she points him toward repentance and redemption. Additionally, they 
read the narrative of Jesus and Lazarus, in which Jesus raises Lazarus from the dead. 
Raskolnikov appears to still have this passage in mind during the redemption scene when 
Dostoevsky describes Raskolnikov’s thoughts: “he was risen and he knew it.”  
 Now the narrative example can only go so far, and there are, of course, things that are not 
stated explicitly. For one, it is not explicitly stated that Raskolnikov repents; secondly, it is not 
explicitly stated that what Raskolnikov gains is knowledge of the existence of God. Both of 
these, I believe, are implicit within the narrative. Regarding repentance, I would suggest that the 
self-integration that occurs between Raskolnikov’s last encounter with Sonya and the opinion of 
the inmates, and the encounter in this redemption scene evidence an internal change in 
Raskolnikov towards the good. For the entire novel, Raskolnikov has been divided against 
himself—divided against the good, as evidence by the Svidrigailov/Sonya external conflict—and 
has been unable to come close to anyone. He is removed from his only friend, Razumikhin, he is 
removed from his mother and sister, he is removed from Sonya; he is even distant from people 
generally, as in the inmates’ perception of him. It is startling that this has suddenly changed in 
his approach to Sonya, and I believe it is only because there is a change within. He is no longer 
divided against himself because he has become integrated around the good.110 It is only because 
 
109 It is worth comparing Raskolnikov’s thesis about morality and the individuals who can step over it with 
his dream in Siberia, which is possibly the extension of this idea into the world in large form. Nonetheless, as I have 
stated above, it is most plausible to find in Raskolnikov an awareness of his guilt and also a wounding to his pride 
that he feels it. 
110 Though there is not space remaining to fully dive into this account of self-hood, Eleonore Stump has 
marvelously treated these issues in Wandering in Darkness, chs. 5-8 (especially ch. 7). 
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repentance has occurred—because re-integration around the good has occurred—that 
Raskolnikov is able to fall on his knees before Sonya and is able to love another person. This is 
all further strengthened by Dostoevsky conveying that by the time Raskolnikov returns to the 
barracks, the inmates have already started to look at him differently. Raskolnikov realizes this 
and understands it, thinking, “but that was how it had to be: did not everything have to change 
now?”111 
 Regarding whether it is that Raskolnikov now believes in the existence of God, I believe 
this is also intended by Dostoevsky; the Lazarus parallel, as well as the symbolic representation 
of Sonya, are intended to suggest this. One might reply that even if the author suggested it, this 
does not mean it is realistic. But again, it is through these kinds of moments, through conscience 
and the witness of holiness, through Scripture, that so many come to a knowledge of God. The 
methods here are also especially important for relating the character of God. Raskolnikov 
understands something of God’s view of righteousness and justice through his conscience, of 
God’s grace, mercy, and love through Sonya, and of God’s compassion through the story of 
Lazarus. All of these intensely personal and morally revealing methods are the ones that 
Dostoevsky portrays in the story. One of the particular strengths of moral apologetics is the 
ability to communicate not just evidence that God exists, but also to communicate who He is. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Finally, we reach the consideration of the main thesis regarding an expansive 
epistemology. Could this same knowledge have been effectively conveyed in propositions? Even 
my main ideas stated in premises would be substantially less impactful removed from the 
 
111 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 550. 
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narrative examples provided throughout and especially in this chapter. This does not mean that 
there are not important things that can be captured propositionally, but there is the potential that 
something is lost when we do this because the truths in discussion here are not just logical and 
notional. They extend beyond this, they are real and experiential and until they are apprehended 
that way, one cannot properly assess their content and judge its warrant. The nature of morality 
requires an expansive epistemology for a full grasp of its import. 
 And so when it comes to the moral argument, arguably when one opens his eyes to an 
expansive epistemology, to the experiential and the poetic, the relational and aesthetic, the 
personal and phenomenological, he finds a wider range of evidence for God’s existence. There 
are epistemological frameworks like Stump’s and Newman’s that can help to categorize this 
broader rationality, expansive epistemology, and richer empiricism, to put some analytical 
clarification around it. There are ways of knowing that sometimes extend beyond what is 
captured by propositions, the narrowly empirical, the domain of logic choppers and positivists. 
These personal ways of knowing provide a congenial context in which to feel the force of the 
moral argument(s) for God’s existence—and for His goodness and grace. 
 In 1922 G. K. Chesterton wrote a sonnet entitled “The Convert,” which seems 
appropriate in relation to Raskolnikov’s journey and the conclusion of this work: 
After one moment when I bowed my head 
And the whole world turned over and came upright, 
And I came out where the old road shone white, 
I walked the ways and heard what all men said, 
Forests of tongues, like autumn leaves unshed, 
Being not unlovable but strange and light: 
Old riddles and new creeds, not in despite 
But softly, as men smile about the dead. 
The sages have a hundred maps to give 
That trace their crawling cosmos like a tree, 
They rattle reason out through many a sieve 
That stores the sand and lets the gold go free: 
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And all these things are less than dust to me 
Because my name is Lazarus and I live.112 
  
 
112 G. K. Chesterton, “The Convert,” The Chesterton Review Vol. 26, Issue 4 (November 2000), 443, 
https://doi.org/10.5840/chesterton200026488. 
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